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Abstract
The study of formal theories of agents has intensi…ed over the last couple of decades,
since such formalisms can be viewed as providing the speci…cations for building ratio-
nal agents and multi-agent systems. Most of the proposed approaches are based upon
the well-understood framework of modal logics and possible world semantics. Although
intuitive and expressive, these approaches lack two properties that can be considered im-
portant to a rational agent’s reasoning: quanti…cation over the propositional attitudes,
and self-referential statements. This paper presents an alternative framework which is
di¤erent from those found in the literature in two ways: Firstly, a syntactical approach
for the representation of the propositional attitudes is adopted. This involves the use of
a truth predicate and syntactic modalities which are de…ned in terms of the truth pred-
icate itself and corresponding modal operators. Secondly, an agent’s information state
includes both knowledge and beliefs. Independent modal operators for the two notions
are introduced and based on them syntactic modalities are de…ned. Furthermore, the re-
lation between knowledge and belief is thoroughly explored and three di¤erent connection
axiomatisations for the modalities and the syntactic modalities are proposed and their
properties investigated.
Keywords: Syntactical Theories, Logics of Knowledge and Belief
1 Introduction
The study of knowledge, belief, truth and reasoning dates back to the time of Aristotle in
Ancient Greece. More recently, one of the earliest and most well-known treatments of reason-
ing about knowledge and belief is the philosophical work of Hintikka [25] in the 1960s. Since
then, reasoning about the epistemic and doxastic notions has stimulated interest and found
applications in such diverse …elds as Linguistics, Game Theory and Arti…cial Intelligence. In
Arti…cial Intelligence and Multi-agent systems in particular, the main objective is to create
computational agents that will be able to exhibit “smart” behaviour. However, to achieve
such an aim, these complex systems need to be endowed with information about the world
they inhabit and the ability to reason with and about this information.
Formalising theories that would describe the behaviour of an intelligent agent is a non-
trivial task. A convenient way of determining such a complex system’s behaviour is by
abstracting away from its mechanistic and design details and considering it to be an inten-
tional system [9]. Hence, an agent is ascribed mental attitudes and characterised as having
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a “cognitive state”. Although there is no consensus as to what are the right ingredients of
an agent’s mental state, it is generally agreed that it should include attitudes representing
the agent’s information state such as knowledge and beliefs, as well as pro-attitudes such as
desires, wishes and intentions.
A number of theoretical models for reasoning agents have been proposed [5, 11, 47, 56, 57].
Most of these formalise the information state of an agent in terms of either knowledge or belief.
However an adequate theory of agents should include both these propositional attitudes [22].
There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the nature of knowledge is di¤erent from
that of belief, since the former is intimately connected with the notion of truth, whereas
the latter does not have this kind of stipulation. Thus, certain things can be accepted as
beliefs (e.g. a belief that it will be sunny tomorrow), but cannot be described as knowledge.
Secondly, an agent’s decisions which actions to perform in order to achieve its goals need to
be based upon information about the world. It seems reasonable to suggest that knowledge
carries a di¤erent weight in the decision making process of an agent than that of beliefs.
Intention formation and its relation to beliefs has been investigated, but its relation and
interdependence with knowledge has not been given much attention. Only a few attempts
have been made to formalise both information attitudes in the same system and axiomatically
capture their relation [31, 54, 55, 33, 42, 58]. Often knowledge is introduced as true belief or
justi…ed true belief [5], but no explicit reference is being made to the relationship between
knowledge and the other attitudes or its role in the agents’ decision making.
A highly desirable feature for a theory of reasoning agents is the ability to quantify over
the objects of the propositional attitudes and express self-referential statements. This stems
from the fact that a rational agent in a multi-agent world needs to be able to reason about
the world and what holds true as well as about its own cognitive state and that of other
agents. This is intimately connected with the ability of an agent to refer to “oneself” in a
number of contexts either directly or indirectly and the ability to quantify over propositions.
Consider the following statements:
John believes things which are false
Carmen and John share the same desires
Most of the current approaches are based on propositional or …rst order modal logics with
possible worlds semantics [5, 11, 47, 56, 57, 60]. Though expressive, these frameworks lack the
ability to express the above statements since quanti…cation over propositions is not allowed.
While this is beyond the expressive power of classical …rst order and modal logics, it can be
expressed in higher order logics. For instance, the above statements could be expressed in
higher intensional logic [39] as follows:
9x<w;t>(BJohn(x) ^ :(x))
8x<w;t>(DCarmen(x), DJohn(x))
But higher order logics are typed and thus the ability to analyse self-referential statements
is lost. An alternative would be to use a syntactical theory. Choosing syntactical theories
over modal logics has certain advantages. Firstly, they can be implemented in …rst order
logic, and secondly, it seems quite natural to be able to represent the information, motivation
and deliberation attitudes of an agent as sentences in some language. The expressive power of
the syntactical approach facilitates quanti…cation over propositions in an elegant way. Their
main disadvantage is that they are prone to inconsistency.
This paper focuses on two issues. Firstly, a syntactical approach for the representation of
the di¤erent elements of an agent’s cognitive state is advocated. Secondly, both information-
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bearing attitudes of knowledge and belief are formalised. Moreover, connection axiomatisa-
tions between knowledge and belief are explored that do not allow the two notions to collapse.
The paper is logically divided into two parts: The …rst part involves the construction of the
framework and includes the presentation of the language and semantics. The modal opera-
tors and syntactic modalities for knowledge and belief are introduced here. Logics for truth
and modalities, and truth and syntactic modalities are also discussed. In the second part the
relation between knowledge and belief is considered. Connection axiomatisations that do not
allow their collapse are investigated. These are considered in the context of both modalities
and syntactic modalities. The paper ends with a discussion of further work, a summary and
the conclusions.
2 Propositional Attitudes and Propositions
Despite its usefulness and convenience the use of the intentional stance raises, apart from
philosophical objections regarding the legitimacy of attributing mental characteristics to ma-
chines [36], the important issue of what are the objects of the intentional notions. What is it
that is believed, known or intended? More often the answer given to this question is that the
objects of the intentional notions are propositions. However, this only creates new questions
about the nature of propositions and there seems to be no consensus among philosophers,
logicians and researchers in Arti…cial Intelligence on that. Nevertheless there seem to be
two main views on the nature of propositions: the syntactical and the semantical. The …rst
regards propositions as sentence-like entities, whereas the second argues that propositions are
not sentences in a language, but their meaning or the represented state of a¤airs or possible
worlds. According to the former, propositions can be constructed from parts according to a
syntax. According to the latter, propositions are sets of possible worlds, and two sentences
express the same proposition just in case they are true in exactly the same possible worlds.
Both views have raised considerable objections.
In the possible worlds conceptualisation propositions are taken to be sets of possible worlds
and properties are understood as functions from individuals to propositions. The epistemic
and doxastic modal operators are treated as functions from propositions to propositions. The
main criticism against this approach is that the concept of a proposition is too-coarse grained;
an agent is logically omniscient as it knows/believes all consequences of its knowledge/beliefs
[13, 12, 34, 35, 43, 46]. Furthermore, if two sentences denote the same sets of possible worlds,
then an agent who knows one is required to know the other. A more …ne-grained notion of
proposition is required, one that will not compel the agent to knowing all logical consequences
of its knowledge.
Alternatively, one may stay within the boundaries of …rst order logic and adopt a syntac-
tical approach. The propositional attitudes are expressed as predicates in which sentences
can occur as terms and these terms are syntactic objects. There are philosophical objections
to the syntactical view of propositions as well. At this point, a distinction needs to be made
between the syntactical approach stemming mainly from the AI community and Computer
Science and the one emanating from Logic and Philosophy. For the discussion here I will refer
to the former as syntactic approaches and the latter as axiomatic theories of propositions.
In a syntactic approach such as the one implicitly advocated by Konolige [29], proposi-
tions are identi…ed as sentences in some language of representation and they are considered
to be syntactic objects. This view seems to provide the …ne-grained notion of a proposition
required for knowledge representation. However, in the presence of self-reference, it is this
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representational view that leads to inconsistency and raises some major philosophical objec-
tions. Intuitively, propositions are not the sentences themselves, but rather their semantic
content. In other words, when an agent knows a proposition it is not the symbols of the lan-
guage that it knows, but rather the abstract object that the sentence denotes. As one would
expect, human agents do not identify propositions with their syntactic representation, but
have an understanding that goes beyond syntax. The problem with the syntactic approach
as has been advocated by most researchers in the AI community, originates from the false
identi…cation of sentences with propositions. Since sentences pick out propositions uniquely,
it is very tempting to regard that there is a one-one correspondence between sentences and
propositions. Inevitably however, there are sentences that do not denote any proposition,
such as the paradoxical ones. Alternatively, axiomatic theories of propositions do not state
what propositions are, but instead they characterise the notion of being a proposition ax-
iomatically. This is the weak representational view where although propositions are denoted
by sentences, the syntactic category of objects denoting propositions is a subset of the w¤ of
the language. Hence, propositions are those objects that can be characterised as being true
or false. In order to avoid the problems of both the aforementioned views a third view of
propositions as collections or arrangements of objects and properties in the world has been
advocated [52].
3 Syntactical Approaches
A rational agent in a multi-agent world needs to be able to reason about the world and what
holds true as well as about its own cognitive state and that of the other agents. This involves
statements that inevitably make reasonable assertions about beliefs, knowledge and other
attitudes. Such statements may require quanti…cation over the objects of the propositional
attitudes or that such objects be denoted by terms. Moreover, an agent may have to refer
to “oneself” in a number of contexts either directly or indirectly. Consider the following
statements:
1: John believes things which are false
2: John knows all the desires of Carmen
3: John knows Carmen has some desires she intends
4: Carmen and John share the same desires
5: Carmen believes John knows all her beliefs
6: Carmen believes John loves Mary
Statements 1-5 require quanti…cation over propositions and (5) in particular involves
self-reference. Hence, agent theories need to be su¢ciently expressive so as to facilitate
quanti…cation over the objects of belief, knowledge and other propositional attitudes as well
as the ability to refer to oneself. In classical propositional modal logic modal operators
can express all the above attitudes which apply to simple propositions and therefore it is
impossible to capture the intuitive meaning of Carmen’s and John’s attitudes. An attempt
to formalise them in classical …rst order logic fails altogether since a predicate of the form
Ki(A) where i the agent and A is the object of knowledge is not a w¤ of predicate calculus.
As a result, it is not possible to express propositional attitudes as predicates in classical …rst
order logic. Although …rst order modal logic is another possible candidate, statements 1-5
cannot be expressed. For instance, (1) requires a variable that ranges over propositions and
this is not allowed in this particular framework. A higher order logic such as [39] can be used
and (1) would then be formalised as:
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9x<w;t>(BJohn(x) ^ :(x))
The variable x ranges over the type of propositions (x<w;t>), where propositions are
taken to be functions from worlds to truth values. This typed nature of higher order logics
does not accord well with human reasoning which is type-free. In addition, higher order
logics are considerably more complex than their …rst order counterparts and they are also
computationally intractable.
Alternatively, one may opt for a syntactical approach within …rst order logic. In such an
approach statements about the world can be treated as objects in the world, in other words
sentences can be treated as terms in a …rst order language. This o¤ers several advantages.
Firstly, it seems quite natural to be able to represent an agent’s attitudes as sentences in
some language. Secondly, since they are formalised within …rst order logic they may lend
themselves directly to implementations [41]. Moreover, they …t well with the representation
of intensionality in natural language [4]. The example statements above could be naturally
represented as follows:
1: 9xBJohn(x) ^ F (x)
2: 8xDCarmen(x)) KJohn(DCarmen(x))
3: KJohn(9xDCarmen(x) ^ ICarmen(x))
4: 8xDCarmen(x), DJohn(x)
5: BCarmen(8xBCarmen(x)) KJohn(BCarmen(x)))
6: BCarmen(0loves(John;Mary)0)
The reading of the predicate K for knowledge is intuitively di¤erent from the reading of
the corresponding modal operator K. For one, the modal operator takes a sentence as its
argument while the predicate takes a term which is the name of the formula in the language.
This term denotes a proposition. A formula of the formKi(Á) is interpreted as “agent i knows
that Á”, whileKi(pÁq) is read “agent i knows pÁq”. In the syntactical approach ‘that’-clauses
are treated as singular terms which may contain externally quanti…able occurrences of vari-
ables. The di¤erence between syntactic theories and modal theories may be considered to be
roughly analogous to the di¤erence between direct quotation (“Carmen believes,‘John loves
Mary”’), and indirect quotation (“Carmen believes that John loves Mary”). Any kind of
sayable or writable string may be embedded in direct quotation, while only meaningful sen-
tences may be embedded in indirect quotation; “John knows ‘kjhdka sdfasd”’ is meaningful,
while (“John knows that kjhdka sdfasd”) is not [8].
Consider sentence 6: 0loves(John;Mary)0 is a term denoting a proposition. An external
agent required to reason from 6 about Carmen’s beliefs needs to unquote what Carmen be-
lieves and reason with the resulting proposition. So any fully expressive logic of propositional
attitudes requires terms denoting propositions and a way of unquoting such terms. The way in
which this unquoting is achieved is by the introduction of a Truth predicate, which says of its
argument that the proposition it denotes is true, so that T (0loves(John;Mary)0) asserts the
truth of the proposition loves(John;Mary): T (0loves(John;Mary)0), loves(John;Mary)
The expressive power of the syntactical approach facilitates among other things quan-
ti…cation over the objects of the propositional attitudes in an elegant way. This is a highly
desirable feature for a theory of reasoning agents; one which is lacking from current approaches
[5, 55, 47, 60].
Promising as the syntactical approach may sound, it su¤ers from a major drawback.
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3.1 Syntactical Theories and Inconsistency
In the syntactical approach sentences can be treated as terms in a …rst order language. There
are two ways in which this can be achieved:
a) Through arithmetisation (diagonalisation). The theory includes certain fragments
of arithmetic and it can talk about its own syntax by identifying syntactic objects with
natural numbers. Thus, it can represent its syntactic properties and relations by means of
arithmetical predicates. In this way self-referential statements can be constructed by having
sentences referring to their own codes.
b) Through a method of quotation. For instance, the term 0loves(john;mary)0 represents
the proposition loves(john;mary). The unquoting of the term is achieved through the use
of a Truth predicate which says of its argument that the proposition it denotes is true:
T (0loves(john;mary)0), loves(john;mary) (Tarskian Biconditional)
However the syntactical approach has one major disadvantage: it is prone to inconsistency.
The above schema for unquoting a term in a syntactical theory allows the construction of a
sentence which asserts its own falsity: “This sentence is false”, known as the Liar [3]. The
contradiction stems from a combination of the following features of a logical theory T :
(i) construction of statement names as well as self-referential statements in the language
(ii) acceptance of ordinary logical laws
(iii) acceptance of the passage from the truth of statement to a statement itself and vice
versa
Assume a logical system T with a speci…ed syntax and an underlying logic. The small
Greek letters ‘Á’, ‘Ã’... range over the statements of the logical language L, which are also
closed under the classical propositional operators ^;_;:;);,. The customary rules of
propositional calculus hold. A formula Á with at most one free variable x is denoted by Á(x)
and for t an individual term Á(t) is the result of substituting t for x in Á. Naming in the
language is included by allowing each statement Á of L to have a name, that is with each Á is
associated a closed term pÁq. Then self-referential statements can be constructed as follows:
for each formula Ã(x) a statement Á which is equivalent to Ã(pÁq) can be constructed. The
following axiom schema is accepted for a truth predicate T (Á) which is interpreted as “Á is
true”:
TB T (pÁq), Á 8Á 2 L
The Diagonalisation Lemma guarantees that there is a Á such that Á , :T (pÁq) [49].
Using the TB-schema and transitivity of equivalence T (pÁq) , :T (pÁq) is obtained. Let
a = T (pÁq). Consequently, both (a ) :a) and (:a ) a) are provable. From ordinary
propositional reasoning (a ) :a) ) :a is derived, and hence :a follows by modus ponens.
But then a follows in the same way from the other implication, a contradiction, and thus,
the theory T is inconsistent.
A similar assertion can be made involving knowledge [40]. Hence, it is very di¢cult to pro-
vide a suitable axiomatisation for the intentional notions without introducing inconsistency.
Montague [39] proved negative results regarding the consistency of …rst order syntactical
theories for knowledge. Assuming a …rst order syntactical treatment of knowledge ¡ and the
following axiom schemas:
i) K(pÁq)) Á
ii) K(pK(pÁq)) Áq)
iii) if ` Á then ` K(pÁq)
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iv) K(pÁ) Ãq)) (K(pÁq)) K(pÃq))
then ¡ is inconsistent [39].
Thomason [51], inspired by Löb’s [49] version of the Hilbert-Bernays Derivability Conditions,
extended this result for the weaker notion of belief by replacing i) with:
v) B(pÁq)) B(pB(pÁq)q).
3.2 Avoiding the Inconsistency
In order to retain consistency, three kinds of restrictions may be considered in a syntactical
system: i) restriction of syntax, ii) restriction of logic and …nally iii) restriction of basic
principles.
The …rst serious attempt to avoid the paradox of the Liar sentence was that of Tarski
[50] via a hierarchy of languages. The escape route taken is that of restricting the syntax
(i). If I begin with an “object language” L, I can use an enriched “meta-language” L0 with
a predicate TrueL that can be applied to the true sentences of the original language. Since
the truth predicate applies to all and only the true sentences of L it will allow me to say (in
L0) many of the things I wanted to say using the intuitive notion of truth at least for the
original object language. Indeed, this use of an object language and a meta-language avoids
the paradox. But the same predicate TrueL cannot be used to refer to sentences of the same
meta-language. For this reason a new meta-language L00 that stands in the same relation to
L0, as L0 stood to L; has to be de…ned. This hierarchy of languages however, does not seem
to accord well with our intuitions. Human languages do not have distinct levels each with
its own truth predicate. Instead there is only one word “true” which applies to all sentences.
Even if human languages are left aside, and the assertions and reasoning of arti…cial agents
are considered, it is still di¢cult to have knowledge of the level of the agent’s utterances.
Yet another disadvantage is that if two statements are on the same level, neither can talk
about the truth or falsity of the other. Moreover, as Kripke [32] points out, it is impossible
to assert that all the statements in such a sequence of languages are true; this would require
a meta-language of trans…nite level above all the other languages. Finally, by employing such
a hierarchy of languages the ability to express self-referential statements is lost altogether.
In an attempt to overcome the problems generated by the Tarskian account for truth,
Kripke [32] developed a theory that allowed circular reference and contained its own truth
predicate. His solution involves restrictions of the logic (ii). He developed a method for
approximating the usually unattainable idea of …nding an interpretation for a logical language
L, in which the extension of the truth predicate T coincides with the set of all sentences of L
true on that interpretation. This method is based on an iterative revision process in which
repeated adjustments of the extension of T are required. Each progressive adjustment consists
of making the extension of T equal to the set of sentences that have just been determined as
true. Kripke used the Kleene strong three-valued logic, although other valuation schemes can
be used as well. The Kripkean account of truth permits truth-value gaps; sentences need not
be true or false. Thus, paradoxical sentences are neither true nor false, but they are rendered
“unknown”. Those sentences that are assigned a truth value after the revision process are said
to be “grounded” and the rest are said to be “ungrounded”. Kripke proves two fundamental
results about the revision process. Firstly, the revision process is monotonic, and secondly
it eventually terminates: a saturation point is reached where no new sentences are added to
the extension or anti-extension of the truth predicate.
Motivated by the work of Kripke, Gupta [21] and Herzberger [24] developed alternative
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approaches towards a theory of Truth. Rather than adopting the Kleene strong three-valued
logic for the revision process, they remained within classical two-valued logic. They imposed
restrictions on the basic principles governing the truth predicate, in particular they rejected
the principle of bivalence T (Á) _ T (:Á). Their method is based on an iterative revision
process as well, but assigns truth values to a larger set of sentences than Kripke’s theory
does. For instance, the Truth Teller (“This sentence is true”) that is ungrounded in Kripke’s
account, can take a truth value in the Gupta-Herzberger semantic theory of truth. Following
Gupta and Herzberger, Asher and Kamp [2] investigated theories which could be used as the
basis for logics of knowledge and belief. Their work combines the Gupta-Herzberger iterative
revision process with a possible worlds semantics. Instead of having a truth predicate, they
consider a belief predicate B which is to be taken as true of all and only those sentences which
are believed to be true by some …xed agent a. The sentences that are believed are all those
that are true in all the belief-possible worlds according to the agent. The belief predicate B,
as the truth predicate in the Gupta-Herzberger semantic theory of truth, has an extension
now at every possible world w. This extension should coincide with the set of sentences true
in all of w’s alternative possible worlds. The iterative revision process is called to adjust the
extension of B at w when the two sets of sentences are not the same. Although they do not
o¤er a single system as an epistemic or doxastic logic, they provide useful results regarding
coherency in di¤erent models M of a …rst order language L depending on the accessibility
relation R over possible worlds, the initial extension of the model (kBk0M;w) and the kinds
of self-reference that are allowed inM (quanti…cational or designative).
3.3 Related Work in Arti…cial Intelligence
Syntactical theories seem to be an attractive way of formalising the intentional notions and
the properties of arti…cial agents. Such agents should be able to make assertions about their
knowledge and beliefs as well as about the other agents’ knowledge and beliefs. Within Arti-
…cial Intelligence, among the …rst to propose the use of a syntactical approach was McCarthy
[37] with a …rst order language that includes concepts (terms) that are the names of the terms
and the formulae of the language.
An alternative approach was advocated by Konolige [28], with a hierarchical meta-language
framework for reasoning about an agent’s beliefs, knowledge, and actions. In Konolige’s for-
malism the agent’s beliefs are represented as sentences in an object language OL which is
a …rst order logic with equality. Then the propositional attitude of belief is expressed as a
predicate in the meta-language ML. More speci…cally, Konolige introduces a meta-language
function th which takes as argument an agent and returns the agent’s theory of the world,
i.e. a set of object-language formulae. Three predicates are introduced in the meta-language:
i) TRUE(f), expresses that the object language formula is true in a speci…c world
ii) FACT (t; g), expresses that f is one of the base formulae of theory t
iii) PR(t; f), means that f is provable in theory t, and it can be given an axiomatisation
as required
Knowledge which is de…ned as true belief, is introduced in the meta-language as a pred-
icate. The formalism also includes the situation calculus, a standard name function, and a
denotation function to overcome some of the object/meta-language problems. Nested beliefs
can be expressed by extending the two-language hierarchy to a three-language one. This
approach su¤ers unfortunately from several drawbacks:
a) a three-language hierarchy requires complex technical machinery for linking the lan-
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guages
b) the agent’s nested beliefs are limited to two levels
c) only one agent is allowed to reason about the other agent’s beliefs
d) computationally the approach seems to be ine¢cient and expensive due to the meta-
level factor
e) some of the axioms of belief commit the agent to logical omniscience
Perlis [44, 45] also investigated the possibility of a …rst order logic of truth and knowledge.
Perlis starts by weakening the Tarskian Biconditional T (A) , A by replacing it with the
schema T (A) , A¤ based on the work of Gilmore [19]. A¤ is the result of replacing in a
formula A each connective occurrence of the form :T (B) by T (:B). Although the law of
excluded middle holds, the law of bivalence does not hold (T (A) _ T (:A)). In this way
paradoxical sentences are dealt with since T (A) and T (:A) are both allowed at the same
time. Perlis also considers a syntactic modality for belief with a K4 axiomatisation and then
knowledge is de…ned as true belief.
Turner [53] built an axiomatic theory of propositions, truth and modality based upon the
ideas of Kripke [32], Gupta [21] and Herzberger [24]. He advocated a weak representationalist
view that supports a …ne-grained notion of proposition. Only a subclass of sentences denote
propositions, and these are the objects that can be true or false. He investigated various
logics of stable truth and how these logics can be integrated with standard modal systems
to produce useful systems for Knowledge Representation. Following the work of Turner,
Davies [6] developed a self-referential …rst order language with a truth predicate whose terms
are those of the Lambda Calculus. In order to achieve consistency and avoid the Tarskian
paradox propositions are con…ned only to those sentences that are true or false:
P (A) =def T (A) _ T (:A)
The proposed logic includes an axiomatisation of truth and belief, while knowledge is
introduced as true belief.
More recently Morreau and Kraus [41] advocated a syntactical treatment for the proposi-
tional attitudes and extended previous results of des Rivieres and Levesque [10]. In their work
des Rivieres and Levesque investigated the consistency of theories in which the axiom schemas
for knowledge do not range over all sentences of the language, but only over a subset of them
called regular sentences. While this result is very useful, certain things cannot be expressed
with regular formulae. For instance, quanti…cation over the objects of the propositional atti-
tudes cannot be instantiated in a knowledge base without introducing inconsistency. Morreau
and Kraus extend the applicability of the axiom schemes of knowledge (or belief) to what
they call RPQ-formulae (regular formulae with propositional quanti…cation). RPQ formulae
include the regular formulae of des Rivieres and Levesque, but in addition quanti…cation over
the propositional attitudes is permitted through the use of two additional predicates P (picks
out the Gödel numbers of sentences of the original language La) and T (picks out the true
sentences of La). These two new predicates take as arguments new variables X;Y; :::: which
instantiate with Gödel numbers of sentences. In this way the RPQ formulae are more ex-
pressive than regular formulae since they allow quanti…cation over the propositional objects.
Although a Truth predicate is introduced, no semantics or axiomatisation is given. The result
of the use of RPQ formulae is that formulae that quantify over the objects of propositional
attitudes can be included in a knowledge base without introducing inconsistency; it is the
scope of the axiom schemes that is being restricted and not the use of other formulae in the
knowledge base which can contain other formulae than RPQ.
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4 Formal Framework
In the following sections the details of the logical language and the basic building blocks of
the theory are spelt out. Proofs are provided in Appendix A.1.
4.1 Logical Language
To facilitate principles like the Tarskian Biconditional some statement-naming and/or ab-
straction devices are needed. For reasons of generality and simplicity an underlying …rst
order language L0 and a …rst order theory T0 are assumed. Initially, assume that the lan-
guage L0 contains a constant symbol 0 also written 0, a binary operation symbol dr and
unary operation symbols q1 and q2. Moreover, the underlying …rst order theory T0 has the
following formulae provable:
(i) dr(x; y) 6= 0
(ii) q1(x; y) = x ^ q2(x; y) = y
Consequently, dr( ; ) acts as a pairing operation from M2 !M ¡ f0g; for which q1 and
q2 are the corresponding projection operations. In T0 the structure of natural numbers can
be represented by de…ning x0 = (x; 0). Thus, q1 acts as the predecessor operation and from
the axioms of T0 I derive:
(iii) x0 6= 0
(iv) x0 = y0 ! x = y
Tuples (t1; :::; tk) can be introduced recursively by (t1) = t and (t1; :::; tk+1) = ((t1; :::; tk); tk+1).
Moreover, there are corresponding projection operations qki (1 6 i 6 k) satisfying qki (t1; :::; tk) =
ti in T0.
The language of the theory L is based on [4] and it is a …rst order language which in
addition to the apparatus of L0 contains:
(i) a set of connective symbols {:;^;_;);,}
(ii) a set of quanti…ers {8; 9}
(iii) a set of punctuation symbols {(, ), ,}
(iv) a predicate = for expressing equality
(v) a set of variables V
(vi) a set of relation symbols Pk>0
The terms and w¤ of L are de…ned by (simultaneous) recursion as follows:
(i) every variable, constant or term of L0 is a term of L
(ii) if P is a predicate letter and t1; ::; tk are terms, then P (t1; ::; tk) is an atomic w¤
(iii) if t1 and t2 are terms, then t1 = t2 is a w¤
(iv) if A and B are w¤, so are :A, A ^B, A _B, A) B and A, B
(v) if A is a w¤ and x1; :::; xk; y1; :::; yn include all the variables of A, then bx1; :::; bxk[A] is
a term in which x1; :::; xk are bound and y1; :::; yn are free.
(vi) every w¤ of L0 is a w¤ of L
(vii) if x is a variable and A is a w¤, then 8xA and 9xA are w¤
The existential quanti…er can be de…ned in terms of the negation symbol and the universal
quanti…er as 9xA =def :8x:A. If a variable occurs inside the scope of a quanti…er the
occurrence of the variable is said to be bound; otherwise the occurrence of the variable is said
to be free.
Following Feferman [17] the terms of L could be introduced as terms of L0. For a w¤ A,
using the apparatus of L0 let rA be the Gödel number of A. If A has free variables among
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x1; :::; xk; y1; :::; yn then (ra; y1; :::; yn) serves as an operation in L0 which “abstracts” x1; :::; xk
treating y1; :::; yn as parameters. I can then de…ne:
¢k bx1; :::; bxk[A(x1; :::; xk; y1; :::; yn)] = (rA; y1; :::; yn)
Hence, (rA; y1; :::; yn) is the term representing the formula A(x1; :::; xk; y1; :::; yn) and by
de…nition is a term of L. Here, I will simply write A instead of (rA; y1; :::; yn) where no
confusion can arise. For k = 0:
¢0 [A(y1; :::; yn)] = (rA; y1; :::; yn)
which is identi…ed with rA when n = 0. The purpose of the denotational device ¢k is
in connection with the truth axiom. For each k a (k + 1)-placed predicate symbol Tk is
introduced where Tk(x1; :::; xk; A) is read “(x1; :::; xk) satis…es A”. For the special case k = 0,
a truth predicate T is introduced which operates on terms, i.e. T0 = T:
(viii) if t is a term, then T (t) is a w¤
A false predicate is then de…ned as F (t) =def T (:t).
4.2 Model Theory
A model for the logical language L is a tuple M = hU;¼; T ;Fi where:
- U is the universe of discourse with the following restrictions:
(i) the domain of individuals is constant, and
(ii) the domain U is cartesian closed (i.e. is closed under the formation of tuples; if d1,
d2,...,dn 2 U then ( d1, d2,...,dn) 2 U).
- ¼ is used to determine the truth values of the atomic formulae of the language, apart from
the truth and the false predicate.
- T is the extension of the truth predicate, that is T : U ! f0; 1g:
- F is the extension of the false predicate, that is F : U ! f0; 1g.
The additional condition T \ F = ; is imposed on the extensions of T and F so that no
term can be both true and false. kk is de…ned as follows:
k x kv= v(x)
k 0 kv= 0 2 U
k (t1; t2) kv= (k t1 kv; k t2 kv)
The support relations where v is a mapping of variables into U; are as follows:
M j=v P (t1; ::; tk) i¤ hv(t1); :::; v(tk)i 2 ¼(P k)
M j=v :A i¤ M 6j=v A
M j=v T (t) i¤ T (k t kv) = 1
M j=v F (t) i¤ F(k t kv) = 1
M j=v A ^B i¤ M j=v A and M j=v B
M j=v 8xA i¤ for all d in U; M j=v[d=x] A
Similarly for the other connectives and quanti…er.
4.3 Proof Theory
The formal system of …rst order predicate calculus with equality is adopted. For any w¤ A,
B and C of L:
A) (B ) A)
(A) (B ) C))) ((A) B)) (A) C))
(:B ) :A)) ((:B ) A)) B)
8xA(x)) A(t) where t is a term free of x in A(x)
(8x(A) B)) (A) 8xB)) where A contains no free occurrences of x
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A;A) B ` B
A ` 8xA
I write FOPC` A if A is provable in this system.
5 Stable Truth
The intuitions for the truth predicate dictate that whatever is asserted to be true, must be
so. Thus, the appropriate axiom schema (Tarskian Biconditional) is as follows:
TkB. Tk(bx1; :::; bxk; [A(x1; :::; xk; y1; :::; yn)]), A(x1; :::; xk; y1; :::; yn)
For k = 0 this reduces to:
T0B. T0([A(y1; :::; yn)]), A(y1; :::; yn)
and in particular, for n = 0 it reduces to:
TB. T ([A]), A
However, the inclusion of such an axiom schema in the logic leads to inconsistency. In
order to maintain consistency something must be given up. In the Gupta-Herzberger [21, 24]
semantic theory the escape route to the semantic paradoxes is to discard the principle of
bivalence:
Biv. T (A) _ T (:A)
In other words, not all sentences in the language denote propositions; some sentences are
paradoxical. The intuitions underlying the Gupta-Herzberger [21, 24] semantic theory are
based on the idea of a semi-inductive iterative revision process. This revision process starts
with simple statements that do not contain the word true and they are assigned a truth
value according to the empirical facts. As the process continues, more and more statements
involving complex assertions about truth and falsity are assigned a truth value.
Given the model M for L, as de…ned above, de…ne M 0 = hU; ¼;T 0;F 0i the Tarskian revi-
sion of M such that:
T 0(k t kv) =
½
1 if M j=v A(y1; ::; yn) where t = (rA; y1; :::; yn)
T (k t kv) otherwise
F 0(k t kv) =
½
1 if M j=v :A(y1; ::; yn) where t = (rA; y1; :::; yn)
F(k t kv) otherwise
where v is an assignment of elements of U to variables. Only the w¤ change since for the
other elements such as constants and variables the T and F do not change. Starting from a
modelM with arbitrary extensions of T and F and using the above revision step, a sequence
of T (n) and F(n) for n >= 0 can be de…ned:
i)T (0) = T
F(0) = F
ii) T (n+ 1) = T (n0)
F(n+ 1) = F(n0)
iii) for a limit ordinal k de…ne
T (k)(d) = 1 iff 9j(j < k) 8h(j · h < k) (T (h)(d) = 1)
F(k)(d) = 1 iff 9j(j < k) 8h(j · h < k) (F(h)(d) = 1)
Under this revision process the notion of stability can be de…ned as:
- an element d of U is positively stable i¤ 9j 8k ¸ j T (k)(d) = 1
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- an element d of U is negatively stable i¤ 9j 8k ¸ j F(k)(d) = 1
- d is stable i¤ it is positively or negatively stable
- d is positively stable from k i¤ 8j ¸ k T (j)(d) = 1
- d is negatively stable from k i¤ 8j ¸ k F(j)(d) = 1
The notion of a stabilisation ordinal is central to the Gupta-Herzberger approach. A
stabilisation ordinal is that point in the revision process at which no more objects will become
(stably) true or false, that is a saturation point has been reached where nothing more can be
said about truth and falsity. An ordinal ¾ is a stabilisation ordinal i¤:
i) 8d 2 U , d is positively stable i¤ T (¾)(d) = 1
8d 2 U , d is negatively stable i¤ F(¾)(d) = 1
ii) 8d 2 U , d is positively (negatively) stable implies that d is positively (negatively)
stable from ¾.
Theorem 1 ([24]) There exists a stabilisation ordinal.
There are two notions of validity that are of interest. The …rst is generated by the class of
sentences that are true at all stabilisation models, while the second by the class of sentences
that are stably true. These are de…ned as follows:
De…nition 2 a) a w¤ A is safe i¤ A is valid at every stabilisation ordinal.
b) a w¤ A is stably true i¤ T (A) is safe and it is stably false i¤ F (A) is safe.
5.1 Basic Logic of Truth
Consistent logics of truth for knowledge representation were investigated by Turner [53]. The
standard modal logic D will serve as the basic logic of truth here. The following naming
convention is adopted: the name of the axiom will be indicated by the capital letter T (for
truth) followed by a dash and the name of the axiom as is usually referred to in the literature.
Small modi…cations will be made and where the classical axioms S5 and S4 are used, I will
write them as 5 and 4 instead. The necessitation rule will be indicated by an N and the
Barcan formula by a B.
T-K. T (A) B)) (T (A)) T (B))
T-D. T (A)) :T (:A)
T-B. 8xT (A)) T (8xA)
T-N. If ` A then ` T (A)
Theorem 3 ([53]) D is a consistent logic of truth and all the theorems of D are stably true.
Additional axioms can be considered in order to strengthen the logic such as the standard
axioms T-T, T-4, T-5:
T-T. T (A)) A
T-4. T (A)) T (T (A))
T-5. :T (A)) T (:T (A))
However, adding the T-T axiom to the D logic of truth results in inconsistency.
Theorem 4 The logic of Truth T is inconsistent.
Turner [53] proves that although T-T and T-4 are safe they are not stably true, whereas
T-5 is not even safe. Thus if consistency is to be retained, none of these axioms can be added
to the logic without making additional compromises.
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5.2 Restricted Logics of Truth
The logic D described in the previous section utilises the full rule of necessitation which
allows the inference from any valid w¤ A to the w¤ T (A). Although the T-T and T-4 axioms
cannot be allowed in combination with the full rule of necessitation since they do not preserve
stability, nevertheless they are safe and can be added to the logic of truth provided that the
rule of necessitation is restricted. This is achieved by prohibiting the application of the rule
to any theorems derived using T-T or T-4.
Let T[X] be the logic which consists of the T-K,T-D, and the T-B axiom (T is not to be
confused for the standard system T but instead here is used to denote the logic of the truth
predicate) and X be a subset of {T-T,T-4}, the safe axioms of truth.
Theorem 5 The T-RN1 rule can be consistently added to the T[X] logics of truth:
T-RN1. If `FOPC A then ` T (A)
Moreover, the stronger T-N rule can be added to the family of logics T[X]:
Theorem 6 The T-RN rule can be consistently added to the T[X] logics of truth:
T-RN. If D` A then ` T (A)
The rule is now called T-RN to indicate that although it is used in the family of logics T[X]
its application is restricted. The application of T-RN is allowed on a wider set of formulae
than that of T-RN1 (theorems of FOPC), formulae that have been derived with the T-K,T-D
and the T-B axioms. From this point onwards the family of logics T[X] will be understood
as including this weakened rule.
Theorem 7 The logics T[X] where X is {T-T} or {T-T,T-4} are consistent logics of truth.
6 Modalities
The next step in the construction of the logics is to incorporate modal operators for the
intentional notions. A modal operator for knowledge and one for belief are added, which for
the time being are independent of one another. The logical language L is extended to L1
with the following two clauses:
(i) if A is a w¤, then Knowi(A) is a w¤
(ii) if A is a w¤, then Beli(A) is a w¤
The index i identi…es the individual agent. The classical possible worlds semantics will
be employed to interpret the modal operators [26]. In line with this, the model theory of
stable truth needs to be reformulated as well. A model for the logical language L1 is a tuple
M = hW;Ki;Bi; U; ¼; T ;Fi where:
- W is a set of possible worlds.
- Ki are the knowledge accessibility relations for each agent i of the domain.
- Bi are the belief accessibility relations for each agent i:
- U is the domain of discourse with the additional restriction that each individual constant
is a rigid designator, i.e. denotes the same individual in all possible worlds.
- ¼ is used to determine the truth values of the atomic formulae of the language, apart from
the truth and the false predicate; it is a function from predicate letters and possible worlds
into relations on U of the appropriate arity.
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- T is the extension of the truth predicate, that is T : U £W ! f0; 1g:
- F is the extension of the false predicate, that is F : U £W ! f0; 1g:
The conditions supporting the truth in such models are de…ned by the following clauses
where v is a mapping of variables into U and w;w0 2W :
M j=v;w P (t1; ::; tk) i¤ hv(t1); :::; v(tk)i 2 ¼(P k; w)
M j=v;w :A i¤ M 6j=v;w A
M j=v;w Knowi(A) i¤ for all w0 such that Ki(w;w0) Mv;w0 j= A
M j=v;w Beli(A) i¤ for all w0 such that Bi(w;w0) Mv;w0 j= A
M j=v;w T (t) i¤ T (k t kv;w) = 1
M j=v;w F (t) i¤ F(k t kv;w) = 1
M j=v;w A ^B i¤ M j=v;w A and M j=v;w B
M j=v;w 8xA i¤ for all d in U; M j=v[d=x];w A
Similarly for the other connectives and quanti…er.
The Tarskian revision of the model M is de…ned as M 0 = hW;Ki;Bi; U; T 0;F 0i where T
and F are now relativised to possible worlds:
T 0(k t kv;w) =
½
1 if M j=v;w A(y1; ::; yn) where t = (rA; y1; :::; yn)
T (k t kv;w) otherwise
F 0(k t kv;w) =
½
1 if M j=v;w :A(y1; ::; yn) where t = (rA; y1; :::; yn)
F(k t kv;w) otherwise
The interesting w¤ are those that are valid in stabilised models which are called ¡¢-
models. ¡ indicates the model for knowledge which can be any of the following:
D-, the knowledge accessibility relation is serial;
T-, the knowledge accessibility relation is re‡exive and serial;
S4-, the knowledge accessibility relation is transitive, serial and re‡exive;
S5-, the knowledge accessibility relation is symmetric, transitive and re‡exive.
¢ indicates the model for belief which can be any of the following:
D-, the belief accessibility relation is serial;
KD4-, the belief accessibility relation is transitive and serial;
KD45-, the belief accessibility relation is Euclidean, transitive and serial.
The notion of safeness and stability can be relativised to the class of ¡¢-models under
consideration:
De…nition 8 A w¤ A is ¡¢-safe i¤ it is valid at all stabilisation models for all initial ¡¢-
models M.
De…nition 9 A w¤ A is ¡¢-positively stable if T (A) is ¡¢-safe and it is ¡¢-negatively
stable if F (A) is ¡¢-safe.
6.1 Epistemic and Doxastic Axiomatizations
The logic of the epistemic operator for knowledge Know can be any of the standard modal
logics D, T, S4, or S5 with full necessitation. The full rule of necessitation is allowed for the
modal operator in contrast with the truth axiomatisation. The di¤erence is that the modal
operator does not use a term as its argument (which can be a quoted sentence), but a simple
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sentence. From this point onwards the following naming conventions for the various axiom
schemas will be adopted:
(i) the names of axioms and rule for the modal operator Knowi will be indicated by a small
letter ‘k’, followed by a dash and the name of the axiom or rule;
(ii) the names of axioms and rule for the modal operator Beli will be indicated by a small
letter ‘b’, followed by a dash and the name of the axiom or rule.
The strongest axiomatisation for knowledge and belief is the S5 and KD45 systems re-
spectively:
Knowledge
k-K. Knowi(A) B)) (Knowi(A)) Knowi(B))
k-D. Knowi(A)) :Knowi(:A)
k-T. Knowi(A)) A
k-4. Knowi(A)) Knowi(Knowi(A))
k-5. :Knowi(A)) Knowi(:Knowi(A))
k-B. 8xKnowi(A)) Knowi(8xA)
k-N. If ` A then ` Knowi(A)
Belief
b-K. Beli(Á) Ã)) (Beli(Á)) Beli(Ã))
b-D. Beli(Á)) :Beli(:Á)
b-4. Beli(A)) Beli(Beli(A))
b-5. :Beli(A)) Beli(:Beli(A))
b-B. 8xBeli(A)) Beli(8xA)
b-N. If ` A then ` Beli(A)
The T axiom is not part of the axiom system for belief. It seems intuitively correct to
allow agents to have false beliefs at times. The logic consisting of the D logic for the epistemic
operator for knowledge, and the D logic for the doxastic operator of belief will from now on
be called KBm. The family of logics KBm[X,Y] is obtained, where X can be {k-T}, {k-T,
k-4} or {k-T,k-4,k-5}, and Y {b-4} or {b-4,b-5}.
6.2 Logics for Modalities and Predicate Truth
The …rst system that can be obtained in which the epistemic and doxastic modal logics are
combined with predicate truth is the system in which the strongest axiom is D for all three
notions. This system will be called TKBm:
Truth
T-T. T (A) B)) (T (A)) T (B))
T-D. T (A)) :T (:A)
T-B. 8xT (A)) T (8xA)
T-N. If ` A then ` T (A)
Knowledge
k-K. Knowi(A) B)) (Knowi(A)) Knowi(B))
k-D. Knowi(A)) :Knowi(:A)
k-B. 8xKnowi(A)) Knowi(8xA)
k-N. If ` A then ` Knowi(A)
Belief
b-K. Beli(Á) Ã)) (Beli(Á)) Beli(Ã))
b-D. Beli(Á)) :Beli(:Á)
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b-B. 8xBeli(A)) Beli(8xA)
b-N. If ` A then ` Beli(A)
Theorem 10 If TKBm ` A then A is ¡¢-stably true where ¡ is D and ¢ is D as well.
There are three possible directions in which the logic can be extended: (i) by adding
stronger axioms for the epistemic operator for knowledge; (ii) stronger axioms for the doxastic
operator for belief; or …nally (iii) stronger axioms for truth. For the …rst two directions the
standard modal axioms k-T, k-4, k-5 for knowledge and b-4 and b-5 for belief respectively,
are considered.
Theorem 11 a) The axioms k-T, k-4, k-5, for the knowledge operator are ¡-safe where ¡
are T-, S4-, S5- models respectively.
b) The axioms b-4, b-5, for the belief operator are ¢-safe where ¢ are KD4-, KD45- models
respectively.
Let Y be any subset of the modal axioms for knowledge Y={k-T,k-4,k-5} and Z be any
subset of the modal axioms for belief {b-4,b-5}, then TKBm[Y,Z] is the TKBm logic plus the
subsets Y and Z together with the full rules of necessitation:
T-FN. if TKBm[Y,Z]` A then TKBm[Y,Z]` T (A)
k-FN. if TKBm[Y,Z]` A then TKBm[Y,Z]` Knowi(A)
b-FN. if TKBm[Y,Z]` A then TKBm[Y,Z]` Beli(A)
Theorem 12 If TKBm[Y,Z]` A then A is ¡¢-stably true where Y is {k-T},{k-T,k-4},{k-
T,k-4,k-5} and Z is {b-4}, {b-4,b-5} and ¡ is respectively T-,S4-,S5-model and ¢ is KD4-,
KD45-model respectively.
The third option is to extend the logic by adding stronger axioms for truth, such as T-T
and T-4, provided that the rule of necessitation is weakened. Let TKBm[X,Y,Z] be the logic
TKBm[Y,Z] as above where X now is any of {T-T}, {T-T,T-4} safe axioms of truth, together
with the following rules:
T-RN. if TKBm[Y,Z]` A then TKBm[X,Y,Z]` T (A)
k-FN. if TKBm[X,Y,Z]` A then TKBm[X,Y,Z]` Knowi(A)
b-FN. if TKBm[X,Y,Z]` A then TKBm[X,Y,Z]` Beli(A)
Theorem 13 If TKBm[X,Y,Z]` A then A is ¡¢-stably true where X is any combination of
the safe axioms of truth, Y is {k-T},{k-T,k-4},{k-T,k-4,k-5}, Z is {b-4},{b-4,b-5} and ¡ is
a T-,S4,S5-model and ¢ is a KD4-, KD45-model respectively.
Theorem 14 The axioms:
kt1. Knowi(T (A)), T (Knowi(A))
kt2. Knowi(A)) Knowi(T (A))
bt1. Beli(T (A)), T (Beli(A))
bt2. Beli(A)) Beli(T (A))
can be consistently added to the family of logics TKBm[X,Y,Z].
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7 Syntactic Modalities
The language L1 is extended to L2 by adding two new predicates Ki and Bi for knowledge
and belief respectively. These are indexed by i in order to identify the individual agent. The
following two clauses are added to the language:
(i) if t is a term then Ki(t) is a w¤
(ii) if t is a term then Bi(t) is a w¤
However, such a direct treatment of knowledge and belief as predicates as Montague
[39] and Thomason [51] showed, results in inconsistency. These results seem to show that
syntactical treatments of the propositional attitudes are not viable. In the presence of self-
reference, axiom schemas characterising knowledge and even weaker schemas characterising
belief, give rise to inconsistency. As a consequence, none of the standard logics T, S4 and
S5 for knowledge and KD4 and KD45 for belief are consistent as logics for the syntactic
modalities.
Turner [53] suggests an alternative approach. This involves de…ning a syntactic modal-
ity (predicate) in terms of a classical modal (sentential) operator and the truth predicate.
Following this approach and using the language L1 two predicates Ki and Bi are de…ned:
Ki(t) =def Knowi(T (t))
Bi(t) =def Beli(T (t))
Model theoretically these de…nitions are supported by the following clauses:
M j=v;w Ki(A) i¤ for all w0 such that Ki(w;w0) T (k A kv;w0) = 1
M j=v;w Bi(A) i¤ for all w0 such that Bi(w;w0) T (k A kv;w0) = 1
Now a translation mechanism between the language of syntactic modality L2 and the
classical language of modal logic L1 can be employed (the subscript i denoting an agent has
been omitted from the modal operators and the syntactic modalities):
(1) trans(x) = x
(2) trans(pAq) = ptrans(A)q
(3) trans(K(t)) = Know(T (trans(t)))
(4) trans(B(t)) = Bel(T (trans(t)))
(5) trans(T (t)) = T (trans(t))
(6) trans(A ^B) = trans(A) ^ trans(B)
(7) trans(:A) = :trans(A)
(8) trans(8xA) = 8x trans(A)
Similarly for the other connectives and quanti…er.
8 Logics for the Syntactic Modalities
The language that will be used to write down the logics of truth and syntactic modality is
L3. L3 consists of the truth predicate and the syntactic modalities for knowledge and belief.
The translation mechanism introduced in the previous section between L2 and L1 can be
employed to determine the consistent logics for the syntactic modalities. From this point
onwards, the following naming convention is adopted:
(i) the names of axioms and rule for the syntactic modality Ki will be indicated by a capital
letter ‘K’, followed by a dash and the name of the axiom or rule;
(ii) the names of axioms and rule for the syntactic modality Bi will be indicated by a capital
letter ‘B’, followed by a dash and the name of the axiom or rule.
18
The …rst combined system is called STKB and the strongest axiom of truth, syntactic
knowledge and syntactic belief is D:
Truth
T-K. T (A) B)) (T (A)) T (B))
T-D. T (A)) :T (:A)
T-B. 8xT (A)) T (8xA)
T-N. If ` A then ` T (A)
Knowledge
K-T. Ki(A) B)) (Ki(A)) Ki(B))
K-D. Ki(A)) :Ki(:A)
K-B. 8xKi(A)) Ki(8xA)
K-N. If ` A then ` Ki(A)
Belief
B-K. Bi(A) B)) (Bi(A)) Bi(B))
B-D. Bi(A)) :Bi(:A)
B-B. 8xBi(A)) Bi(8xA)
B-N. If ` A then ` Bi(A)
Theorem 15 STKB is a consistent logic of truth and syntactic modalities.
As with the logics of truth and classical modality there are three ways in which STKB
can be extended: by adding i) stronger axioms for truth; ii) stronger axioms for syntactic
knowledge; and iii) stronger axioms for syntactic belief. However, given the de…nition of
the modal predicates in terms of the respective modal sentential operators and the truth
predicate, an additional di¢culty arises. The axioms for the modal predicates are a¤ected by
the same problems as the axioms of truth. Caution is required in order to obtain consistent
logics for the syntactic modalities as well. Results regarding logics of truth are known from
the previous sections.
Let STKB[X,Y,Z] be the logic STKB as de…ned previously and X be a subset of the safe
axioms of truth {T-T,T-4}, Y be a subset of the axioms of syntactic knowledge {K-T,K-
4} and Z be the axiom of syntactic belief {B-4}. Furthermore, since now the syntactical
axiomatisations are infected by the problems of the truth predicate, K-T, K-4 and B-4 are
rendered safe, but not stably true. Consequently, the necessitation rules for knowledge and
belief need to be weakened:
T-RN. if STKB` A then STKB[X,Y,Z]` T (A)
K-RN. if STKB` A then STKB[X,Y,Z]` Ki(A)
B-RN. if STKB` A then STKB[X,Y,Z]` Bi(A)
Theorem 16 The STKB[X,Y,Z] family of logics is consistent.
Theorem 17 (a) The following axioms linking knowledge with truth can be consistently
added to the STKB[X,Y,Z] logics:
KT1. Ki(T (A)), T (Ki(A))
KT2. Ki(A)) Ki(T (A))
(b) The following axioms linking belief with truth can be consistently added to the STKB[X,Y,Z]
logics:
BT1. Bi(T (A)), T (Bi(A))
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BT2. Bi(A)) Bi(T (A))
(c) The axioms KT1 and KT2 allow the derivation of the following:
Ki(A), Ki(T (A)), T (Ki(A))
(d) The axioms BT1 and BT2 allow the derivation of the following:
Bi(A), Bi(T (A)), T (Bi(A))
The equivalences (c) and (d) seem natural properties for knowledge and belief. If an agent
knows something, then it knows it is true and it is true that it knows it; similarly for belief.
This concludes the presentation of the combined systems for predicate truth and the
syntactic modalities of knowledge and belief. Additional systems can be uncovered by utilising
the non-standard axioms of truth considered by Turner [53], this is left open to investigation.
9 Knowledge and Belief
The logics introduced in the previous sections have independent modal or syntactic operators
for the epistemic notion of knowledge and the doxastic notion of belief. Axiom schemas that
connect knowledge with truth and belief with truth were introduced, but no such axiom
schemas relating knowledge with belief were considered. In fact, the accessibility relations
that are used in the model for knowledge and belief are completely independent of each other.
This separation of knowledge and belief was introduced on purpose so that one need not have
to worry during the construction of the framework about their relation.
The nature of knowledge and belief as well as their connection and di¤erences, have been
heavily debated in the philosophical literature, without however producing any de…nitive an-
swers [1, 20, 23, 48]. As used by human agents they are both information-bearing attitudes.
However, knowledge of a fact presupposes that the fact is true, whereas a belief is not neces-
sarily always true. The verb “believe” is considered to have a psychological ‡avour since the
state of believing is connected with the internal psychological state of the agent [8]. On the
other hand, the verb “know” is not connected with the internal state of an agent, but clearly
with the state of the world. A very common de…nition of knowledge in Philosophy which has
been adopted in Computer Science and in Arti…cial Intelligence as well, is that of knowledge
being “true belief” or “justi…ed true belief”. But as Gettier [18] argued, this may not always
be the case and truth and belief may be necessary, but not su¢cient conditions to ascribe
knowledge to an agent. This criterion of knowledge being just true beliefs gives too generous
a de…nition of knowledge; an agent might happen to have some true beliefs that would not
be reasonable to characterise as knowledge. Imagine an agent that always believes that it is
noon; it would not be reasonable to say that each day at noon the agent has knowledge that
it is noon.
Although the aim here is not to clarify the issues on the nature and relationship of knowl-
edge and belief, the following sections will discuss possible connection axiomatisations for the
two attitudes. Since computational agents is the main focus of this paper, the verb “believe”
does not have a psychological ‡avour. Instead, whenever an agent believes something, this
has an air of “doubt” about it, the agent is not absolutely con…dent that what it believes,
holds true. It might …nd out later that it was mistaken and in fact its belief was false. On
the other hand, knowledge cannot be allowed to be false. Whatever the agent knows to be
true must hold true as well. Before proceeding with the presentation of the connection ax-
iomatisations, the following subsection discusses related work on systems of knowledge and
belief.
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9.1 Related Work on Systems of Knowledge and Belief
Kraus and Lehmann’s [31] formalisation is probably one of the …rst attempts to combine
both information attitudes in the same system. The system that they introduce is based on
a propositional modal language with two modal operators K and B, for knowledge and belief
respectively. Additional operators are introduced to express group attitudes. Semantics
to the language is given in terms of possible worlds with underlying knowledge and belief
accessibility relations Ki and Bi respectively. Ki is an equivalence relation and Bi satis…es
the conditions:
i) Bi is serial
ii) Bi is contained in Ki, that is Bi µ Ki
iii) 8 w;w0; w00 2W , if Ki(w;w0) and Bi(w0; w00), then Bi(w;w00)
Kraus & Lehmann’s system (KL) is essentially a combination of an S5 system for knowledge
and a KD45 system for belief. There are two interesting axioms relating knowledge and belief:
KiÁ) BiÁ, an agent believes everything it knows.
BiÁ) KiBiÁ, an agent knows its own beliefs, i.e. beliefs are conscious.
It is also suggested that an agent could believe that its beliefs amount to knowledge:
(*) BiÁ) BiKiÁ
However, incorporating such an axiom into KL would result in knowledge collapsing to be-
lief. van der Hoek [54] attempts to …nd systems where (*) would be allowed without yielding
BiÁ) KiÁ, and reaches the conclusion that the two accessibility relations should not corre-
spond. (*) is only reasonable if BiÁ stands for “i is convinced that Á” and not for “i presumes
Á”. A disadvantage of the KL system is that BiKiÁ) KiÁ is a derived theorem which may
contradict some of the intuitions about belief, since an agent may believe that it knows Á
without however Á being true.
Voorbraak [58, 59] concentrates on rather idealised notions of knowledge and belief which
he calls Objective Knowledge and Rational Belief. Therefore the operator KaÁ for knowledge
intuitively is read as “the agent a objectively knows Á”, that is the agent knows Á if Á is true in
every world that is possible according to the information available to a. The modal operator
BaÁ means “agent a is rationally convinced that Á”, that is Á is valid in every world that is
considered possible by a. This notion of rational belief is very strong however, and in reality
most of the times a much weaker notion of belief is used. Semantics to the propositional
language considered by Voorbraak is given not in terms of classical possible worlds but by
using generalised functional models [58, 59]. As it is shown the generalised functional model
for knowledge corresponds with Kripke models for the modal system S5 while the one for
belief corresponds with Kripke models for modal logic KD45. The accessibility relation for
knowledge as in the modal logic S5 is an equivalence relation and the accessibility relation for
belief is serial, euclidean and transitive as in the KD45 logic. The following are the connection
axioms adopted by Voorbraak:
B(Á)) K(B(Á))
:B(Á)) K(:B(Á))
B(Á)) B(K(Á))
The OK&RIB system di¤ers from the KL system proposed by Kraus and Lehmann [31]. The
theorem B(Á)) B(K(Á)) that causes knowledge to collapse with belief in KL is present in
Voorbraak’s system without causing problems. He argues that the de…nition of knowledge as
“justi…ed true belief” or “true belief” leads to problems and thus the theorem KiÁ) BiÁ is
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not valid in OK&RIB. Knowledge and belief are quite separate notions and even if a belief
is true it does not always constitute knowledge. However, Voorbraak’s system deals with
notions of knowledge and belief that may be considered to be quite strong. Especially the
notion of belief is very strong for an agent that is not infallible.
Lammare and Shoham [33] aimed at capturing the connection between the two notions
and their relation with certainty. They based their approach upon the idea that knowledge
entails certainty which in turn entails belief. Knowledge for the agent is facts for which it
is certain, however there is no such connection between certainty and belief. They strongly
reject the negative introspection property for a logic of knowledge certainty and belief, since
negative introspection seems to result in counterintuitive properties because of the way these
notions are de…ned.
Shoham and Moses [42] depart from the customary view that belief is the primitive notion
and knowledge can then be de…ned in terms of it, and instead take knowledge as primitive
and consider belief to be derivable. They accept the S5 modal system for knowledge, but “an
agent believes Á” is taken to mean “the agent knows that either Á, or else something speci…c
unusual is the case”. In other words, they de…ne belief as knowledge relative to an assumption
and the assumption is taken to be defeasible. As part of the de…nition the assumptions that
the agent used to form a particular belief are included, however the choice of assumptions
seems to be arbitrary.
Israel [27] accepts only the schema that knowledge requires belief for a logic that combines
the epistemic and doxastic notions:
Ki(Á)) Bi(Á)
whereas he rejects:
Bi(Á)) Ki(Bi(Á))
Ki(Á)) Bi(Ki(Á))
In van der Hoek et al. [55], the authors present a rich framework for formalising the
properties of reasoning agents. Four modal operators are introduced: Bki , B
o
i , B
c
i , and B
d
i ,
for expressing what the agent knows, believes to be true by observation, believes through
communication and believes by default respectively. Knowledge is regarded as information
that the agent has been designed with such as domain speci…c facts, and is considered to be
…xed and true. Observational beliefs is information that the agent observes and are regarded
to be true. Communicational and default beliefs are not required to be true. The following
connect the four attitudes:
(Boi Á) Á) ^ (Bki Á) Á)
(Bki Á) Boi Á) ^ (Boi Â) BciÂ) ^ (BciÃ ) Bdi Ã)
The knowledge and observational belief operators have the properties of the S5 logic, whereas
the communicational and default belief operators those of K45.
10 Connection Axiomatisations for Modal Knowledge and Belief
In the following subsections three possible connection axiomatisations for modal knowledge
and belief are presented. The …rst two are considered in the strongest combined system of
truth and modal knowledge and belief which is TKBm[{T-T,T-4},{k-T,k-4,k-5},{b-4,b-5}],
while the third in the weaker TKBm[{T-T,T-4},{k-T,k-4},{b-4,b-5}]. The results regarding
the connection axioms in the modal case are applicable to simple combined modal systems
of knowledge and belief. The relevant proofs are provided in Appendix A.1.
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10.1 Weak Modal Connection
Since knowledge and belief are both information-bearing attitudes, it is reasonable to accept
that the weakest form of relation between them is that of consistency:
Wkb. Beli(A)) :Knowi(:A)
This axiom expresses that knowledge and beliefs are consistent and hence, if an agent
believes A, then at least it does not know :A. This seems to be a reasonable constraint and
in line with our intuitions about knowledge and belief. This axiom schema requires that the
intersection of the set of knowledge-accessible and belief-accessible worlds is not the empty
set:
Lemma 18 Wkb is sound in all models that satisfy the semantic condition:
WSC. 8w; 9w0 Ki(w;w0) ^ Bi(w;w0)
Additional connection axioms can be considered in order to re…ne the relationship between
knowledge and belief. For instance, one may accept the principle that if an agent believes A,
then it knows that it believes it, which is a form of introspection:
kb1. Beli(A)) Knowi(Beli(A))
Lemma 19 kb1 is sound in all models that satisfy the semantic condition:
C1. 8w;w0; w00 Ki(w;w0) ^ Bi(w0; w00)) Bi(w;w00)
Another possible connection axiom for knowledge and belief states that if an agent believes
A, then it believes that it knows A as well:
kb2. Beli(A)) Beli(Knowi(A))
Lemma 20 kb2 is sound in all models that satisfy the semantic condition:
C2. 8w;w0; w00 Bi(w;w0) ^Ki(w0; w00)) Bi(w;w00)
This is another form of introspection, but it is stronger than that expressed by the kb1
axiom since now the agent considers its beliefs to amount to knowledge. Furthermore, one
can accept a form of negative introspection regarding beliefs according to which an agent
that does not believe A, believes that it does not also know A:
kb3. :Beli(A)) Beli(:Knowi(A))
Lemma 21 kb3 is sound in all models that satisfy the semantic condition:
C3. 8w;w0; w00 Bi(w;w0) ^ Bi(w;w00)) Ki(w0; w00)
Proposition 22 The following formulae are theorems in a modal system of knowledge (S5)
and belief (KD45) that satis…es the semantic conditions WSC, C1, C2 and C3.
1. Beli(A), Knowi(Beli(A))
2. Beli(A), Beli(Knowi(A))
3. :Beli(A), Knowi(:Beli(A))
4. :Beli(A), Beli(:Knowi(A))
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10.2 Strong s1 Modal Connection
Most of the philosophical approaches presume a strong connection between knowledge and
belief: knowledge always implies belief. Such an approach is adopted for instance in Kraus
and Lehmann’s [31] system. Axiomatically this is captured by the following:
Skb. Knowi(A)) Beli(A)
Semantically this axiom requires that the accessibility relation for belief is contained in
the accessibility relation for knowledge, Bi ½ Ki. Thus, the belief-accessible worlds are a
subset of the knowledge-accessible worlds.
Lemma 23 Skb is sound in all models that satisfy the semantic condition:
SC. 8w;w0 Bi(w;w0))Ki(w;w0)
The following result is obtained for the logics of modalities and predicate truth:
Theorem 24 The following are valid formulae connecting modal knowledge and belief with
predicate truth in the TKBm[X,Y,Z] family of logics with the Skb axiom.
1. Knowi(A)) Beli(T (A))
2. Knowi(A)) T (Beli(A))
As in the weak connection axiomatisation, additional properties can be considered in
order to re…ne the relationship between knowledge and belief. For instance, the axiom that
expresses that an agent knows all its beliefs can be adopted here as well by imposing the
semantic condition C1 (Lemma 19):
kb1. Beli(A)) Knowi(Beli(A))
One may also consider adding the kb2:
kb2. Beli(A)) Beli(Knowi(A))
This requires the semantic condition C2 (Lemma 20) between accessible worlds. However
if C2 is imposed, this has the undesired consequence that knowledge and belief collapse into
the same attitude (Beli(A), Knowi(A)):
Theorem 25 ([54]) If the logic of knowledge and belief satis…es the following conditions:
(i) 8w;w0; w00 Bi(w;w0) ^Ki(w0; w00)) Bi(w;w00)
(ii) 8w;w0 Bi(w;w0))Ki(w;w0)
(iii) Bi is serial, i.e. 8w 9w0 Bi(w;w0)
(iv) Ki is Euclidean, i.e. 8w,w0,w00 Ki(w;w0) ^Ki(w;w00))Ki(w0; w00)
then it is also the case that 8w;w0 Ki(w;w0)) Bi(w;w0)
Thus, if the kb2 schema is desirable in a logic also containing the strong connection axiom
between knowledge and belief, one of the above conditions (iii)-(iv) needs to be abandoned
in order to avoid the correspondence of knowledge with belief. van der Hoek [54] refers to
this as the Believed Consciousness of Beliefs problem. Thus, kb2 will not be considered here
as part of the strong s1 connection axiomatisation.
One may consider adding the principle that an agent that does not believe A; believes
that it does not also know A:
kb3. :Beli(A)) Beli(:Knowi(A))
Unfortunately, if kb3 is adopted as an axiom then :Beli(A), Beli(:Knowi(A)) (*) is a
theorem of the system. :Knowi(A)) Beli(:Knowi(A)) is also a theorem (Proposition 26)
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and by modus ponens Beli(:Knowi(A)). From this and (*) Beli(:Knowi(A))) :Beli(A),
and by modus ponens :Beli(A) is obtained. Thus, ` :Knowi(A) ) :Beli(A) and by
contraposition ` Beli(A) ) Knowi(A). As a result, knowledge collapses into belief, and
therefore the kb3 axiom is not part of the strong s1 connection axiomatisation for modal
knowledge and belief.
Proposition 26 The following formulae are theorems in a modal system of knowledge (S5)
and belief (KD45) that satis…es the semantic conditions SC and C1.
1. Beli(A), Knowi(Beli(A))
2. Knowi(A), Beli(Knowi(A))
3. :Beli(A), Knowi(:Beli(A))
4. :Knowi(A), Beli(:Knowi(A))
5. Knowi(A)) Knowi(Beli(A))
6. Knowi(A)) Beli(Beli(A))
10.3 Strong s2 Modal Connection
The accessibility relation in the previous strong s1 connection axiomatisation between knowl-
edge and belief was taken to be an equivalence relation. As was shown in Theorem 25, if one
wishes to incorporate the kb2 axiom between knowledge and belief and certain conditions
apply, the notion of knowledge collapses to that of belief. In the s2 connection axiomatisation
the accessibility relation for knowledge is taken to be re‡exive, serial and transitive, and thus
the k-5 axiom for knowledge (negative introspection) is not included. The strong connection
axiom is adopted:
Skb. Knowi(A)) Beli(A)
The result of Theorem 24 pertains here as well since TKBm[{T-T,T-4},{k-T,k-4},{b-4,b-
5}] is one of the logics in the TKBm[X,Y,Z] family. Furthermore, the semantic conditions
C1 and C2 (Lemmas 19 and 20) are imposed and accordingly the kb1 and kb2 axioms are
adopted:
kb1. Beli(A)) Knowi(Beli(A))
kb2. Beli(A)) Beli(Knowi(A))
Since the negative introspection axiom for knowledge is rejected, two theorems of the s1
connection can only be introduced as axioms:
kb4. :Knowi(A)) Beli(:Knowi(A))
kb5. :Beli(A)) Knowi(:Beli(A))
Lemma 27 a) kb4 is sound in all models that satisfy the semantic condition:
C4. 8w;w0; w00 Ki(w;w0) ^ Bi(w;w00))Ki(w0; w00)
b) kb5 is sound in all models that satisfy the semantic condition:
C5. 8w;w0; w00 Bi(w;w0) ^Ki(w;w00)) Bi(w0; w00)
The kb3 axiom (:Beli(A) ) Beli(:Knowi(A))), which in the strong s1 connection ax-
iomatisation causes knowledge to collapse into belief, cannot be included here.
Proposition 28 The following formulae are theorems in a modal system of knowledge (S4)
and belief (KD45) that satis…es the semantic conditions SC, C1, C2, C4 and C5.
1. Beli(A), Knowi(Beli(A))
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2. Beli(A), Beli(Knowi(A))
3. :Beli(A), Knowi(:Beli(A))
4. :Knowi(A), Beli(:Knowi(A))
5. Knowi(A)) Knowi(Beli(A))
6. Knowi(A)) Beli(Beli(A))
The three connection axiomatisations for modal knowledge and belief were investigated
along the lines of the strongest systems for knowledge and belief that do not allow the two
notions to collapse. Intermediate results can be obtained for weaker systems of knowledge
and belief. Space does not allow the presentation of all these weaker systems, but the reader
can get a ‡avour of the systems available in Appendix A.2.
11 Connection Axiomatisations for Syntactic Knowledge and Belief
Based upon the connection axiomatisations for modal knowledge and belief the following
sections present connection axiomatisations for the respective syntactic modalities. Notably,
the rules of necessitation for both syntactic modalities are weakened in order to retain consis-
tency. The axiomatisations are considered in the context of the strongest system STKB[{T-
T,T-4},{K-T, K-4},{B-4}].
11.1 Weak Syntactic Connection
Following the same route as in the modal case, a weak connection axiomatisation between
syntactic knowledge and belief is …rst considered.
Proposition 29 The following axioms can be consistently added to STKB[{T-T,T-4}, {K-
T, K-4}, {B-4}] in order to de…ne a weak connection.
1. WKB. Bi(A)) :Ki(:A)
2. KB1. Bi(A)) Ki(Bi(A))
3. KB2. Bi(A)) Bi(Ki(A))
4. KB3. :Bi(A)) Bi(:Ki(A))
The resulting system is pre…xed by ‘W-’ to indicate that it includes the weak syntactic
connection axioms.
Proposition 30 The following are theorems in W-STKB[{T-T,T-4}, {K-T, K-4}, {B-4}]:
1. Bi(A), Ki(Bi(A))
2. Bi(:Ki(A))) :Ki(A)
In contrast to the modal case, the following are non-theorems:
6` :B(A)) K(:B(A))
6` B(K(A))) B(A)
6` B(:K(A))) :B(A)
11.2 Strong S1 Syntactic Connection
The strong S1 axiomatisation is again considered in the context of the strongest system:
Proposition 31 The following axioms can be consistently added to STKB[{T-T,T-4}, {K-
T, K-4}, {B-4}] in order to de…ne a Strong S1 connection between knowledge and belief:
1. SKB. Ki(A)) Bi(A)
2. KB1. Bi(A)) Ki(Bi(A))
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The resulting system is indicated by the pre…x ‘S1-’.
Proposition 32 The following are theorems in S1-STKB[{T-T,T-4}, {K-T, K-4}, {B-4}]:
1. Bi(A), Ki(Bi(A))
2. Ki(A)) Bi(Ki(A))
3. Ki(A)) Ki(Bi(A))
4. Ki(A)) Bi(Bi(A))
Non-theorems include:
6` :Bi(A)) Ki(:Bi(A))
6` Bi(Ki(A))) Ki(A)
6` :Ki(A)) Bi(:Ki(A))
In addition, the following formulae connect knowledge with belief and truth:
Proposition 33 The following are theorems in S1-STKB[{T-T,T-4}, {K-T, K-4}, {B-4}]:
1. Ki(A)) Bi(T (A))
2. Ki(A)) T (Bi(A))
11.3 Strong S2 Syntactic Connection
The equivalent of the s2 connection axiomatisation for the syntactic modalities can be ob-
tained as follows:
Proposition 34 The following axioms can be consistently added to STKB[{T-T,T-4}, {K-
T, K-4}, {B-4}] in order to de…ne a Strong S1 connection between knowledge and belief:
1: SKB. Ki(A)) Bi(A)
2. KB1. Bi(A)) Ki(Bi(A))
3. KB2. Bi(A)) Bi(Ki(A))
4. KB4. :Ki(A)) Bi(:Ki(A))
The resulting system is pre…xed by ‘S2-’ to indicate that it includes the strong S2 con-
nection axioms.
Proposition 35 The following are theorems in S2-STKB[{T-T,T-4},{K-T, K-4},{B-4}]:
1. Bi(A), Ki(Bi(A))
2. Ki(A)) Bi(Ki(A))
3. Ki(A)) Ki(Bi(A))
4. Ki(A)) Bi(Bi(A))
5. :Ki(A), Bi(:Ki(A))
The formula B(K(A))) B(A) is not a theorem and furthermore, the axiom :Bi(A))
Ki(:Bi(A)) which was imposed on the respective s2 type of connection for modal knowledge
and belief, cannot be adopted here since it would render :Bi(A) ) Bi(:Bi(A)) a theorem
of the system. (Proof. Assume :Bi(A), then from the axiom :Bi(A) ) Ki(:Bi(A)) and
modus ponens Ki(:Bi(A)). From the connection axiom SKB it follows that Ki(:Bi(A)))
Bi(:Bi(A)) and by modus ponens Bi(:Bi(A))) The results of Proposition 33 follow for S2-
STKB[{T-T,T-4}, {K-T, K-4}, {B-4}] as well.
As in the modal case, the connection axiomatisations were investigated along the lines of
the strongest system for knowledge and belief that does not allow the two notions to collapse.
Intermediate results can be obtained for weaker systems of knowledge and belief and the
reader is referred for more details to Appendix A.2.
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12 Further Work
The syntactical framework that has been described in this paper o¤ers another possible and
attractive way of formalising the properties of agents and their reasoning.
Although the approach followed involves two independent modal (and syntactic) operators
for knowledge and belief, the alternative view of knowledge being simply true belief can be
accommodated as well. One could start with introducing only one modal operator, that of
belief Beli and de…ne a belief syntactic operator Bi as well as knowledge as follows:
Bi(A) =def Beli(T (A))
Ki(A) =def Bi(A) ^ T (A)
As a result, knowledge always implies belief:
Ki(A)) Bi(A)
As the reader can check the logic for Ki based on an underlying system S4 for truth and
KD4 for belief, is S4 (the necessitation rules are still restricted, as in the case of independent
syntactic modalities). By de…ning knowledge as true belief though, it is not possible to adopt
a weak connection axiomatisation as when independent operators are used.
Apart from knowledge and belief the framework can be used to formalise other proposi-
tional attitudes such as desires and intentions. In particular, the use of a syntactical approach
may address some of the issues regarding intentions as discussed in [30]. Some initial inves-
tigations into formalising desires and intentions have been carried out in [14, 15]. Instead of
BDI agents one may want to consider KBDI agents, agents that are characterised by knowl-
edge, beliefs, desires and intentions. The obvious question that springs to mind is why choose
to represent agents as having both knowledge and beliefs. Obviously, if one’s aim is to for-
malise theories of arti…cial agents, it is natural to draw one’s inspiration from human agents.
Even if human agents may not turn out to be very good models in all situations, nevertheless
they provide some guiding principles. On the other hand, highly advanced arti…cial agents
are expected to approximate human commonsense reasoning, and therefore almost necessar-
ily they must be ascribed a variety of human attitudes. In this endeavour information is a
key issue, since it represents what the agent perceives about the world which will then use to
change this world. The use of both knowledge and belief may provide a better understanding
of agents which may lead to more concrete speci…cations and even more realistic or “believ-
able” models of agents. The attribution of knowledge, beliefs, desires and intentions leads to
conceptually richer frameworks capable of characterising agents with diverse features. Among
the most interesting issues open up to investigation are:
i) What is the connection between knowledge-belief and intentions? Surely intentions are
quite di¤erent from desires since they presuppose that the agent is committed towards their
ful…llment. What is the role of knowledge in an agent’s decision making process and how is
that di¤erent to that of belief?
ii) What is the connection between knowledge-belief and the desires of an agent? Would
it be possible that the agent’s desires are completely decoupled from its knowledge and only
related to its beliefs?
In particular, providing notions of realism [47] for KBDI agents, that is a set of connection
axioms relating all four notions, is a non-trivial problem. There may not be a unique notion
of realism that describes the ideal KBDI agent, since there may be no de…nitive answer to
what an ideal KBDI agent is.
Another attitude that could be incorporated is that of obligation. As with desires and
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intentions, this cannot be done willy-nilly, since the relation of the additional attitude with the
existing ones needs to be sorted out at the modal level. The notion of obligation poses some
interesting questions in relation to the other attitudes. For instance, it may be reasonable to
require an agent that is obligated to bring about a state of a¤airs to intend it as well, or at
least to require that the agent should not intend its negation.
Moreover, an agent living in a multi-agent world needs to be able to express and reason
about social attitudes such as common knowledge and mutual belief as well a joint intentions
and social commitments. Another useful extension would be to enrich the framework with
such attitudes.
In the discussion so far the world was regarded as static, no temporal representation has
been considered. But the world is inherently dynamic and this needs to be re‡ected on the
formalism. Despite its shortcomings, situation calculus [38] is probably the simplest way of
incorporating the notion of time into this framework.
The theory would also bene…t from a representation of actions which are the means
by which agents attempt to achieve their objectives and change the world around them.
Actions are entities of some sort, and entities are usually formally represented by singular
terms. Despite actions being regarded as objects, they have an internal structure that other
objects do not. One would like to be able to quantify over actions as it is possible with
other ordinary entities. Action statements need to be extensional in order to conform to
the principle of substitution of equals. For instance, if agent Bill kills John, and John is
Bill0s neighbour, then surely Bill has killed his neighbour is true as well. Nevertheless, there
may be times when actions need to be treated as intensional entities. That is to say that
the way an action is represented may be important: in general knowing how to perform an
action does not imply knowing how to perform the same action if it is described di¤erently.
One possible way of representing actions is to adopt the approach advocated by Davies
[7]. Davies considers actions as individuals which are represented as terms which denote a
restricted class of sentences of the logical language. This would accord well with the rest of the
theory here, since the mechanism for encoding sentences as terms in the language is already
in place. Complex actions like sequential, conditional, actions performed in while loops, weak
and strong concurrent actions would be introduced as functions. Finally, representing and
reasoning about plans is another important extension that would have to be considered.
13 Conclusions
This paper concentrated on two main issues: a syntactical treatment for the representation
of the propositional attitudes and a comprehensive study of the properties of modal and
syntactical systems of knowledge and belief with predicate truth. This work is based upon
and extends the work of Turner [53], whereby although propositions are denoted by sentences,
the syntactic category of propositions is a subset of the w¤ of the language. The framework
allows for quanti…cation over the propositional attitudes as well as the expression of self-
referential statements in the language. To preserve consistency certain measures had to be
taken. Firstly, the rules of necessitation for the logics of predicate truth and the syntactic
modalities of knowledge and belief had to be restricted to derivations not including the
stronger axioms T and S4. Secondly, the negative introspection axiom for both knowledge
and belief was discarded from the syntactical systems since it is not safe. Despite these
restrictions, the logics are still powerful enough to serve as speci…cations for agents. Thus,
agents can reason about their own knowledge and belief, those of the other agents as well as
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what holds true.
Knowledge and belief were formalised independently, …rst as modal operators and then
as syntactic modalities. Three connection axiomatisations were considered in the strongest
combined systems for modal knowledge and belief that do not allow the two notions to
collapse:
i) Weak (w): Knowledge does not necessarily imply belief, but beliefs are consistent with
knowledge.
ii) Strong (s1): Knowledge always implies belief. The principle that an agent that believes
A, also believes that it knows A is not part of this axiomatisation since it causes knowledge
and belief to collapse.
ii) Strong (s2): Knowledge always implies belief, but the negative introspection axiom
for knowledge is discarded here. Instead, the principle that an agent that believes A, also
believes that it knows A is accepted.
The inspiration for the three connection axiomatisations between knowledge and belief
came mainly from three sources: Kraus and Lehmann [31], van der Hoek [54] and Voorbraak
[58]. The weak connection axiomatisation is based upon Voorbraak’s ideas for a logic of
objective knowledge and rational belief. However, the weak connection axiom that guaran-
tees that whenever an agent believes a proposition at least it should not know its negation
(B(A) ) :K(:A)), is not part of Voorbraak’s axiomatisation. Indeed, the author is not
aware of an approach in AI that considers this as the basic connection axiom between knowl-
edge and belief. The strong s1 connection axiomatisation is based on Kraus and Lehmann
system. As a consequence, the principle expressing that an agent that believes that it knows
A also knows A (Beli(Knowi(A)) ) Knowi(A)), is a theorem in the system. This can be
alleviated by discarding the negative introspection axiom for knowledge. The s2 strong con-
nection axiomatisation for modal knowledge and belief is based on the observations of van
der Hoek regarding the drawbacks of Kraus and Lehmann’s system. Since space does not
allow the presentation of the properties of weaker systems in combination with the connection
axiomatisations, the interested reader is referred to the appendix.
Based on the results for the modal case, connection axiomatisations were considered
in the context of logics for the syntactic modalities. Even though syntactical approaches
for knowledge and belief have been studied in the literature, none of these involves both
propositional attitudes as independent predicates. As a result, connection axiomatisations
for syntactic knowledge and belief have not been adequately studied. Such an endeavour
presents two main di¢culties: preserving consistency and avoiding the collapse of knowledge
and belief. As in the modal case three connection axiomatisations were considered:
i) Weak (W): Knowledge does not necessarily imply belief, but beliefs are consistent with
knowledge.
ii) Strong (S1): Knowledge always implies belief. The principle that an agent that believes
A, also believes it knows A is not part of this axiomatisation.
ii) Strong (S2): Knowledge always implies belief, and the principle that an agent that
believes A, also believes it knows A is included.
Again the reader is referred to [16] for details of weaker syntactical systems in combination
with the connection axiomatisations.
The work presented here was motivated partly by the lack of frameworks with su¢cient
expressive power to allow for quanti…cation over propositions and self-referential statements,
and partly by the need to formalise both information attitudes of knowledge and belief as they
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express di¤erent aspects of an agent’s information about the world. As was argued, agent
theories need to be su¢ciently expressive to facilitate quanti…cation over the objects of belief,
knowledge and other propositional attitudes. Moreover, the concepts of knowledge, truth and
belief seem essential for a comprehensive theory of reasoning agents. As a consequence the
framework developed here is rather di¤erent from those found in the literature. A syntactical
approach was advocated which facilitates among other things quanti…cation over propositions
as well as the expression of self-referential statements in an elegant way. This allows for a
richer set of statements regarding an agent’s reasoning about itself and other agents to be
captured. In particular, the example statements of Section 3 which cannot be formalised in
propositional or …rst order modal frameworks such as [5, 55, 47, 60], can be easily formalised
in the developed framework. In fact, the formalisation of the example statements of Section
3 was done within this particular framework. Despite the inherent di¢culty of retaining
consistency while striving for su¢ciently strong axiomatisations, the theory yields expressive
logics of truth, knowledge and belief. It has also been shown how the interaction of knowledge
and belief can be captured while remaining distinct as concepts. This was done both at the
modal as well as at the syntactical level. In particular, this investigation shed new light on
the interaction of knowledge and belief at the syntactical level; this required care in order to
preserve consistency on the one hand and avoid the collapse of knowledge and belief on the
other. As far as the author is aware this has not been considered before.
In conclusion the work presented here o¤ers an alternative framework for formalising
the properties of agents which is more expressive than other approaches in the literature
[5, 55, 47, 60] with respect to quanti…cation over the propositional attitudes and self-referential
statements. The framework has the potential to be extended to a comprehensive theory of
reasoning agents and although a lot of work remains to be done, this exposition lays the
foundations and o¤ers hope in the use of syntactical systems.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof. Theorem 4. From the Diagonalisation Lemma [49] it is known that there is a w¤
A such that: A, T (:A). Then from the necessitation rule T (A, T (:A)) (1) is obtained.
From the tautology (A ) :A) ) :A and necessitation I obtain T ((A ) :A) ) :A) (2).
From the tautology [(A ) :A) ) :A] ) [(A , T (:A)) ) ((T (:A) ) :A) ) :A)]
necessitation yields T ([(A) :A)) :A]) [(A, T (:A))) ((T (:A)) :A)) :A)]) (3).
From (1),(2), (3) and by the T–K axiom T ((T (:A)) :A)) :A) (4) is obtained. Using the
T-T axiom, necessitation and the T-K axiom from (4) I obtain T (:A) (5). By (5) and the
T-T axiom :A (6). On the other hand, by (1) and the T-T axiom: A , T (:A) (7), which
by (5) gives A (8). But (6) and (8) are contradictory.
Proof. Theorem 5. Notice that any w¤ provable in FOPC will be true in all models
and therefore stably true. Hence, if `FOPC A then ` T (A):
Proof. Theorem 6. Notice that any w¤ provable in the D logic will be true in all models
and hence stably true.
Proof. Theorem 7. From Turner [53] it is known that T-T and T-4 are safe and thus
they preserve safety. Moreover from Theorem 3 ([53]) and Theorem 6 it is known that the
rest of the axioms and inference rule preserve safety as well and furthermore they are stably
true.
Proof. Theorem 10. I use induction on the proofs in TKBm. The proof for the axioms
of truth follow the same pattern as in the non-modal case. For T-N (of Truth) it is su¢cient
to observe that if A is true at every world in every model from some ordinal onwards, then
T (A) will be as well. The axioms for Knowi are ¡¢-stably true since they are true at every
world for every ¡¢-model. For k-N of knowledge I observe that if A is true at every world
at every model from some ordinal onwards the Knowi(A) will be. The axioms for the modal
operator Beli are ¡¢-stably true since they are true at every world for every ¡¢-model. For
the necessitation rule again b-N if A is true at every world from some ordinal onwards then
Beli(A) will be as well.
Proof. Theorem 11. For both (a) and (b) It is su¢cient to observe that the axioms
will be true at all worlds in all models of the appropriate kind.
Proof. Theorem 12. From the stable truth of the TKBm axioms it follows that the
axioms are stably true. For the three rules of necessitation it su¢ces to notice that if A is
true in all worlds from some ordinal onwards, then Knowi(A), Beli(A) and T (A) will be true
as well.
Proof. Theorem 13. If A is an instance of any of the axioms of TKBm[Y,Z] I employ
Theorem 12. Consider the k-FN rule. If A is true at every world for every stabilization
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ordinal then Knowi(A) will be true as well. The rule for belief follows in a similar way and
the rule T-RN for truth follows from the fact that all the theorems of TKBm[Y,Z] are ¡¢-
stable where Y and Z are any combination of the epistemic and doxastic axioms respectively
and ¡ and ¢ are the appropriate models.
Proof. Theorem 14. For kt1, let ¾ be any stabilisation ordinal. The left hand side of
the equivalence amounts to:
8w8w0 [Ki(w;w0)) (8¯ > ¾)M(¯) j=v;w0 A]
and the right-hand side amounts to
8w8¯ > ¾8w0[Ki(w;w0))M(¯) j=v;w0 A]
which are obviously equivalent.
For kt2, Knowi(A) model theoretically is supported by the following clause where ®; ¯ are
ordinals and M® is a stabilised model, i.e. ® is a stabilization ordinal:
8¯ > ® 8w;w0 such that Ki(w;w0) then M¯ j=v;w0 A
Then Knowi(T (A)) will similarly be
8¯ > ®+ 1 8w;w0 such that Ki(w;w0) then M¯ j=v;w0 A
Notice that in all models in which Knowi(A) holds, Knowi(T (A)) will hold as well and
consequently the axiom can be added to any logic without introducing inconsistency. Similar
arguments hold for bt1 and bt2.
Proof. Theorem 15. The translation function is employed. I illustrate with the K-
D axiom and the rule K-N. For the K-D axiom assume Ki(A), then by the translation
Knowi(T (A)). By the D-T axiom I obtain T (A) ) :T (:A) and from necessitation for
Know k-N Knowi(T (A)) :T (:A)). By the k-K axiom Knowi(T (A))) Knowi(:T (:A))
and now by modus ponens Knowi(:T (:A)). From the k-D axiom Knowi(:T (:A)) )
:Knowi(::T (:A)) is obtained, and by double negationKnowi(:T (:A))) :Knowi(T (:A)).
By modus ponens I obtain :Knowi(T (:A)) and by employing the translation :Ki(:A). For
the K-N rule assume A, and thus by the translation trans(A). Then by T-N T (trans(A))
and by k-N Knowi(T (trans(A))), and now this translates back to Ki(A).
Proof. Theorem 16. To prove consistency the translation and theorem 15 are employed.
I only have to prove consistency of the axioms for the syntactic modalities. For K-T assume
Ki(A) and thus by the translationKnowi(T (A)). From the k-T axiomKnowi(T (A))) T (A)
and by modus ponens T (A). Now from the T-T axiom T (A) ) A and then by modus
ponens A. For K-4 assume Ki(A) and thus by the translation Knowi(T (A)). From the
T-4 axiom T (A) ) T (T (A)) and by k-N Knowi(T (A) ) T (T (A))). By k-K I obtain
Knowi(T (A)) ) Knowi(T (T (A))) and by modus ponens Knowi(T (T (A))). By the k-4
axiom Knowi(T (T (A))) ) Knowi(Knowi(T (T (A)))) (i) is obtained. By the kt1 axiom
Knowi(T (T (A))) ) T (Knowi(T (A))) and by applying k-N Knowi(Knowi(T (T (A))) )
T (Knowi(T (A)))) and now by distribution of knowledge (k-K) Knowi(Knowi(T (T (A)))))
Knowi(T (Knowi(T (A)))) (ii). From (i) and (ii) and modus ponensKnowi(T (Knowi(T (A))))
is obtained and by the translation Ki(Ki(A)). A similar proof establishes the consistency of
B-4.
Proof. Theorem 17. (a) The translation is employed. For KT1 it yieldsKnowi(T (T (A)))
, T (Knowi(T (A)))which is an instance of the sentential axiomKnowi(T (A)), T (Knowi(A)).
For KT2 by employing the translation I get Knowi(T (A))) Knowi(T (T (A))) which is just
an instance of the sentential axiom kt2.
(b) Again the translation is employed and the proof is similar to (a).
(c-d) Straightforward. I only need to show that Ki(T (A)) ) Ki(A): Assume Ki(T (A))
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then from KT1 T (Ki(A)) and by the T-T axiom for truth I obtain the desired Ki(A).
Proof. Lemma 18. Assume M;w j= Beli(A). Then for all w0 such that Bi(w;w0) I
obtain M;w0 j= A and M;w0 6j= :A. From the semantic condition WSC, there is at least
one world w0 such that Bi(w;w0) ^ Ki(w;w0), therefore M;w 6j= Knowi(:A), and hence
M;w j= :Knowi(:A) as required.
Proof. Lemma 19. Assume M;w j= Beli(A), then for all w0 such that Bi(w;w0),
M;w0 j= A (i). Suppose Ki(w;w0) and Bi(w0; w00), then I obtain M;w0 j= Beli(A) and
M;w j= Knowi(Beli(A)). From the semantic condition C1 I also get Bi(w;w00) and thus
M;w j= Beli(A) and M;w00 j= A as required by (i).
Proof. Lemma 20. Assume M;w j= Beli(A), then for all w0 such that Bi(w;w0),
M;w j= A (i). Suppose Ki(w0; w00), it now follows that M;w00 j= A and M;w0 j= Knowi(A)
and also M;w j= Beli(Knowi(A)). From the semantic condition C2 I obtain Bi(w;w00) and
thus M;w j= Beli(A) and M;w00 j= A as required by (i).
Proof. Lemma 21. Assume M;w j= :Beli(A), then for some w0 such that Bi(w;w0),
M;w0 j= :A. Assume that there is a w00 such that Bi(w;w00) then from the semantic
condition C3 I obtain Ki(w;0w00) and thus M;w0 j= :Knowi(A). It now follows that
M;w j= Beli(:Knowi(A))
Proof. Proposition 22.1. The) direction is already known. For the other direction(,
assume Knowi(Beli(A)), then from the T-axiom for knowledge Knowi(Beli(A))) Beli(A)
and by an application of modus ponens Beli(Á).
2. The ) is obvious, for ( assume Knowi(A). Then from the T-axiom for knowl-
edge Knowi(A) ) A. From the necessitation rule for belief I obtain Beli(Knowi(A) )
A). From the K-axiom for belief (distribution of belief over implication) it follows that
Beli(Knowi(A))) Beli(A).
3. For), assume :Beli(A). From the S5 property of knowledge Ã) Knowi:Knowi:Ã
and for Ã = :Beli(Á) I obtain :Beli(Á)) Knowi:Knowi:(:Beli(Á)). As a result :Beli(Á))
Knowi:Knowi(Beli(Á)) and by modus ponens Knowi:Knowi(Beli(Á)) (¤). From (1) of
this proof I have that Beli(A) , Knowi(Beli(A)) is a theorem of the logic and thus
by negating both parts :Beli(A) , :Knowi(Beli(A)). By necessitation for knowledge
Knowi(:Beli(A) , :Knowi(Beli(A))) and by k-K axiom I obtain Knowi(:Beli(A)) ,
Knowi(:Knowi(Beli(A))). From this and (¤),Knowi(:Knowi(Beli(Á)))) Knowi(:Beli(Á))
follows and by modus ponens Knowi(:Beli(Á)). For the other direction (, assume that
Knowi(:Beli(A)), then from the T-axiom of knowledge Knowi(:Beli(A))) :Beli(A), and
by modus ponens :Beli(A).
4. The) is obvious, for( assumeBeli(:Knowi(A)). Then from the principleBeli(:Ã))
:Beli(Ã) and for Ã = Knowi(A) it follows that Beli(:Knowi(A)) ) :Beli(Knowi(A)).
Now by modus ponens :Beli(Knowi(A)) (¤). I already know that Beli(Knowi(A)) ,
Beli(A) from (2) of this proposition. By negating both parts :Beli(Knowi(A)), :Beli(A).
From this and (¤) it follows that Beli(:Knowi(A)) ) :Beli(A) and by an application of
modus ponens :Beli(A)
Proof. Lemma 23. Assume M;w j= Beli(A). Then for all w0 such that Bi(w;w0) I
obtain M;w0 j= A. From the semantic condition SC it follows that Bi(w;w0) ) Ki(w;w0)
and therefore M;w j= Knowi(A).
Proof. Theorem 24. 1. AssumeKnowi(A). From the Skb axiomKnowi(A)) Beli(A)
and by modus ponens Beli(A). From the bt2 axiom Beli(A)) Beli(T (A)) and from modus
ponens I obtain the required Beli(T (A)).
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2. Assume Knowi(A). From the Skb axiom Knowi(A)) Beli(A) and by modus ponens
Beli(A). From the bt2 axiom Beli(A)) Beli(T (A)) and from modus ponens Beli(T (A)) is
obtained. From the axiom bt1 Beli(T (A)) ) T (Beli(A)) and by modus ponens again the
required T (Beli(A)) is obtained.
Proof. Proposition 26. 1. Similar to the proof of (1) of Proposition 22.
2. For the ) direction, assume Knowi(A). Then, from the positive introspection axiom
for knowledge Knowi(A) , Knowi(Knowi(A)) and by modus ponens Knowi(Knowi(A)).
From the connection axiom of knowledge and belief I now obtain Knowi(Knowi(A)) ,
Beli(Knowi(A)) and by another application of modus ponens it follows that Beli(Knowi(A)).
For the ( direction, assume :Knowi(A) (¤). By the negative introspection axiom for
knowledge it is the case that :Knowi(A) ) Knowi(:Knowi(A)), and by modus ponens
Knowi(:Knowi(A)). By the connection axiom of knowledge and belief Knowi(Á)) Beli(Á)
and for Á = :Knowi(A) I obtain Knowi(:Knowi(A)) ) Beli(:Knowi(A)) and by modus
ponens Beli(:Knowi(A)). From the principle Beli(:Ã) ) :Beli(Ã), Beli(:Knowi(A)) )
:Beli(Knowi(A)) is obtained and by modus ponens I obtain :Beli(Knowi(A)). Thus,
` :Knowi(A)) :Beli(Knowi(A)) and by contraposition Beli(Knowi(A))) Knowi(A).
3. Similar to the proof of (3) of Proposition 22.
4. For the ) direction, assume :Knowi(A). Then, by the negative introspection axiom
for knowledge :Knowi(A))Knowi(:Knowi(A)), and by modus ponensKnowi(:Knowi(A)).
From the Skb axiomKnowi(Á))Beli(Á) for Á = :Knowi(A) I obtainKnowi(:Knowi(A)))
Beli(:Knowi(A)) and thus by modus ponensBeli(:Knowi(A)) and it follows that :Knowi(A))
Beli(:Knowi(A)) as required. For the ( direction, assume Knowi(A). By the K-5 ax-
iom Knowi(A) ) Knowi(Knowi(A)) and by modus ponens Knowi(Knowi(A)). From
the theorem Knowi(Á) ) :Beli(:Á) and Á = Knowi(A) I obtain Knowi(Knowi(A)) )
:Beli(:Knowi(A)) and now by modus ponens :Beli(:Knowi(A)). It now follows that
Knowi(A) ) :Beli(:Knowi(A)) and by contraposition Beli(:Knowi(A)) ) :Knowi(A)
is obtained.
5. Suppose Knowi(A). Then, from the connection axiom Knowi(A) ) Beli(A) and by
modus ponensBeli(Á). From (1) of this proposition it is known thatBeli(A)) Knowi(Beli(A))
and by modus ponens Knowi(Beli(A)).
6. Suppose Knowi(A). Then, from the connection axiom I obtain Knowi(A)) Beli(A)
and by modus ponens Beli(Á). From the positive introspection axiom for belief Beli(A) )
Beli(Beli(A)) and by modus ponens Beli(Beli(A)).
Proof. Lemma 27. a) Assume M;w j= :Knowi(A), then for some w0 such that
Ki(w;w0), M;w0 j= :A. Assume that there is a w00 such that Bi(w;w00), then from the
semantic condition C4 Ki(w;0 w00) and thusM;w0 j= :Knowi(A). It now follows thatM;w j=
Beli(:Knowi(A)).
b) AssumeM;w j= :Beli(A), then for some w0 such that Bi(w;w0),M;w0 j= :A. Assume
that there is a w00 such that Ki(w;w00), then from the semantic condition C5 Bi(w;0 w00) and
thus M;w0 j= :Beli(A) and it now follows that M;w j= Knowi(:Beli(A)).
Proof. Proposition 28. The proofs of (1), (3-6) are similar to (1), (3-6) of Proposition
26, while the proof for (2) is similar to (2) of Proposition 22.
Proof. Proposition 29. 1. AssumeBi(A) then by employing the translationBeli(T (A)).
From the modal axiom connecting knowledge and belief wkb Beli(T (A))) :Knowi(:T (A))
and by modus ponens :Knowi(T (:A)). Through the translation :Ki(:A) is obtained.
2. Assume Bi(A) then by the translation Beli(T (A)). From the modal axiom con-
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necting knowledge and belief kb1 Beli(T (A)) ) Knowi(Beli(T (A))) and by modus ponens
Knowi(Beli(T (A))). From the kt2 axiom Knowi(Beli(T (A)))) Knowi(T (Beli(T (A)))) is
obtained and by modus ponens Knowi(T (Beli(T (A)))). By using the translation mechanism
Ki(Bi(A)).
3. AssumeBi(A). Via the translationBeli(T (A)). By the modal axiom kb2Beli(T (A)))
Beli(Knowi(T (A))) and by modus ponensBeli(Knowi(T (A))). By bt2Beli(Knowi(T (A))))
Beli(T (Knowi(T (A)))) and by modus ponens Beli(T (Knowi(T (A)))). By using the trans-
lation Bi(Ki(A)).
4. Assume :Bi(A) then by employing the translation :Beli(T (A)). From the modal
axiom connecting knowledge and belief kb3 :Beli(T (A)) ) Beli(:Knowi(T (A))) is ob-
tained and by modus ponens Beli(:Knowi(T (A))). From the bt2 axiom it follows that
Beli(:Knowi(T (A))) ) Beli(T (:Knowi(T (A)))) and by an application of modus ponens
Beli(T (:Knowi(T (A)))). By using the translation the desired Bi(:Ki(A)) is obtained.
Proof. Proposition 30. 1. ) obvious from KB1 axiom. For the other direction (
assume Ki(Bi(A)), then by the K-T axiom Ki(Bi(A)) ) Bi(A) and by an application of
modus ponens Bi(A).
2. Assume Ki(A), then by the K-4 axiom Ki(A) ) Ki(Ki(A)) and by modus po-
nens Ki(Ki(A)). From the theorem Ki(A) ) :Bi(:A) it now follows that Ki(Ki(A)) )
:Bi(:Ki(A)) and by modus ponens :Bi(:Ki(A)). Thus, ` Ki(A) ) :Bi(:Ki(A)) and by
contraposition ` Bi(:Ki(A))) :Ki(A).
Proof. Proposition 31. 1. AssumeKi(A), then according to the translationKnowi(T (A)).
From this and the strong connection axiom Skb Beli(T (A)), and by employing the translation
mechanism Bi(A) as required.
2. Assume Bi(A), then through the translation Beli(T (A)). By the modal axiom kb1
Beli(T (A)) ) Knowi(Beli(T (A))) and by modus ponens Knowi(Beli(T (A))). By kt2
Knowi(Beli(T (A))))Knowi(T (Beli(T (A)))) and by modus ponensKnowi(T (Beli(T (A)))).
By using the translation Ki(Bi(A)).
Proof. Proposition 32. 1.Similar to (1) of Proposition 30.
2. Assume Ki(A), then by the K-4 axiom Ki(A) ) Ki(Ki(A)) and by modus ponens
Ki(Ki(A)). From the connection axiom SKB I now have Ki(Ki(A)) ) Bi(Ki(A)) and by
modus ponens again Bi(Ki(A)).
3. Suppose Ki(A), then from the connection axiom SKB Ki(A)) Bi(A) and by modus
ponens Bi(A). Now from (4) of this proposition it is also known that Bi(A) ) Ki(Bi(A))
and thus by modus ponens Ki(Bi(A)).
4. Suppose Ki(A), then from the connection axiom SKB Ki(A) ) Bi(A) and by
modus ponens Bi(A). From the B-4 axiom Bi(A) ) Bi(Bi(A)) and thus by modus po-
nens Bi(Bi(A)).
Proof. Proposition 33. 1. From the SKB axiom Ki(A)) Bi(A) and by modus ponens
Bi(A). From axiom BT2 Bi(A)) Bi(T (A)) and by modus ponens the required Bi(T (A)) is
obtained.
2. From the SKB axiom Ki(A)) Bi(A) and by modus ponens Bi(A). From axiom BT2
I obtain Bi(A)) Bi(T (A)) and by modus ponens Bi(T (A)). From axiom BT1 Bi(T (A)))
T (Bi(A)) and by modus ponens again the required T (Bi(A)) is obtained.
Proof. Proposition 34. For (1-2) the proof is similar to (1-2) of Proposition 31.
3. Assume Bi(A), then by the translation Beli(T (A)). From the modal axiom kb2
Beli(T (A)) ) Beli(Knowi(T (A))) and from modus ponens Beli(Knowi(T (A))). By bt2
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CodeW¤ Conditions
D
D
D
S4
D
S5
T
D
T
S4
T
S5
S4
D
S4
S4
S4
S5
S5
D
S5
S4
S5
S5
w1 Bel(A)) :Know(:A) Axiom X X X X X X X X X X X X
w2 Bel(A)) Know(Bel(A)) Axiom X X X X X X X X X X X X
w3 Know(Bel(A))) Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X X X X
w4 :Bel(A)) Know(:Bel(A)) k-5 &, of w2 X X X
w5 Know(:Bel(A))) :Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X X X X
w6 Bel(A)) Bel(Know(A)) Axiom X X X X X X X X X X X X
w7 Bel(Know(A))) Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X X X X
w8 :Bel(A)) Bel(:Know(A))Axiom X X X X X X X X X X X X
w9 Bel(:Know(A))) :Bel(A), of w6 X X X X X X X X X
Table 1: Modal systems of knowledge and belief and Weak connection axiomatisation.
Beli(Knowi(T (A))))Beli(T (Knowi(T (A)))) and by modus ponensBeli(T (Knowi(T (A)))).
By using the translation mechanism again Bi(Ki(A)).
4. Assume :K(A), then by the translation I obtain :Know(T (A)). Since :Knowi(T (A)))
Beli(:Knowi(T (A))) is a theorem by modus ponens Beli(:Knowi(T (A))). From the bt2
axiom Beli(:Knowi(T (A))) ) Beli(T (:Knowi(T (A)))) and by an application of modus
ponens Beli(T (:Knowi(T (A)))) and by the translation Bi(:Ki(A)).
Proof. Proposition 35. For (1-4) the proof is similar to that of Proposition 32. For
(5), the ) direction is obvious. For the other direction (, the proof is similar to (2) of
Proposition 30.
A.2 Weaker systems
A.2.1 Weaker Systems for modal knowledge and belief
Since space constraints do not allow the presentation of all the weaker systems for modal
knowledge and belief, in this section a synopsis of the properties in weaker systems is provided.
For each connection axiomatisation (weak, strong s1 and strong s2) a table is provided that
contains a number of coded properties and their satisfaction in a combined modal system of
knowledge and belief. The …rst letter indicates the strongest axiom for knowledge while the
second the strongest axiom for belief. Thus T, S5 indicates that the combined system is that
of T for knowledge and KD45 for belief. These tables will provide a guide to the interested
reader, who may want weaker axiomatisations of knowledge and belief. Accordingly, there
are three families of combined modal logics.
i) w-TKBm[X,Y,Z]. These are the logics that are connected via the weak type of connec-
tion. TKBm is a logic of truth and modal knowledge and belief as it was de…ned in Section
6.2.
ii) s1-TKBm[X,Y,Z]. These are the logics that are connected via the strong s1 type of
connection.
iii) s2-TKBm[X,Y,Z]. These are the logics that are connected via the strong s2 type
of connection. Although TKBm is as above, Y does not include the k-5 axiom (negative
introspection for knowledge).
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CodeW¤ Conditions
D
D
D
S4
D
S5
T
D
T
S4
T
S5
S4
D
S4
S4
S4
S5
S5
D
S5
S4
S5
S5
s1:1 Know(A)) Bel(A) Axiom X X X X X X X X X X X X
s1:2 Know(A)) :Bel(:A) s1:1 X X X X X X X X X X X X
s1:3 Bel(A)) Know(Bel(A)) Axiom X X X X X X X X X X X X
s1:4 Know(Bel(A))) Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X X X X
s1:5 :Bel(A)) Know(:Bel(A)) k-5 &, of s1.3 X X X
s1:6 Know(:Bel(A))) :Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X X X X
s1:7 Know(A)) Bel(Know(A)) k-4 X X X X X X
s1:8 Bel(Know(A))) Know(A) k-5 X X X
s1:9 :Know(A)) Bel(:Know(A)) k-5 X X X
s1:10 Bel(:Know(A))) :Know(A) k-4 X X X X X X
s1:11 Know(A)) Know(Bel(A)) s1.3 X X X X X X X X X X X X
s1:12 Know(A)) Bel(Bel(A)) b-4 X X X X X X X
Table 2: Modal systems of knowledge and belief and Strong s1 connection axiomatisation.
CodeW¤ Conditions
D
D
D
S4
D
S5
T
D
T
S4
T
S5
S4
D
S4
S4
S4
S5
s2:1 Know(A)) Bel(A) Axiom X X X X X X X X X
s2:2 Know(A)) :Bel(:A) s2:1 X X X X X X X X X
s2:3 Bel(A)) Know(Bel(A)) Axiom X X X X X X X X X
s2:4 Know(Bel(A))) Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X
s2:5 Bel(A)) Bel(Know(A)) Axiom X X X X X X X X X
s2:6 Bel(Know(A))) Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X
s2:7 Know(A)) Know(Bel(A)) s2:3 X X X X X X X X X
s2:8 Know(A))) Bel(Bel(A)) b-4 X X X X X X
s2:9 :Know(A)) Bel(:Know(A))Axiom X X X X X X X X X
s2:10 Bel(:Know(A))) :Know(A) k-4 X X X
s2:11 :Bel(A)) Know(:Bel(A)) Axiom X X X X X X X X X
s2:12 Know(:Bel(A))) :Bel(A) k-T X X X X X X
Table 3: Modal systems of knowledge and belief and Strong s2 connection axiomatisation.
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CodeW¤ Conditions
D
D
D
S4
T
D
T
S4
S4
D
S4
S4
W1 B(A)) :K(:A) Axiom X X X X X X
W2 B(A)) K(B(A)) Axiom X X X X X X
W3 B(A)) B(K(A)) Axiom X X X X X X
W4 :B(A)) B(:K(A)) Axiom X X X X X X
W5 K(A)) :B(:A) W1 X X X X X X
W6 B(A), K(B(A)) W2 and K-T X X X X
W7 B(:K(A))) :K(A)K-4 and W1 X X
Table 4: Syntactical systems of knowledge and belief and Weak connection axiomatisation.
CodeW¤ Conditions
D
D
D
S4
T
D
T
S4
S4
D
S4
S4
S1:1 K(A)) B(A) Axiom X X X X X X
S1:2 B(A)) K(B(A)) Axiom X X X X X X
S1:3 B(A)) :K(:A) S1:1 X X X X X X
S1:4 B(A), K(B(A)) S1:2 and K-T X X X X
S1:5 K(A)) B(K(A))K-4 and S1:1 X X
S1:6 K(A)) K(B(A))S1:1 and S1:2 X X
S1:7 K(A)) B(B(A)) S1:1 and B-4 X X X
Table 5: Syntactical systems of knowledge and belief and Strong S1 connection axiomatisa-
tion.
A.2.2 Weaker systems for syntactic knowledge and belief
The connection axiomatisations for the logic of truth and syntactic modalities were again
investigated in the context of the strongest system that does not allow knowledge and belief
to collapse. Intermediate results can be obtained for weaker systems of knowledge and belief,
as in the modal case. In this section a synopsis of the properties in the weaker systems is
provided. For each connection axiomatisation (weak, strong S1 and strong S2) a table is
provided that contains a number of coded properties and their satisfaction in a combined
syntactical system of knowledge and belief. The …rst letter indicates the strongest axiom for
knowledge while the second the strongest axiom for belief. Thus T, S4 indicates that the
combined system is that of T for knowledge and KD4 for belief. There are three families of
combined syntactical logics:
i) W-STKB[X,Y,Z]: These are the logics that are connected via the weak connection axioma-
tisation. STKB is a logic of truth and syntactic knowledge and belief as it was de…ned in
Section 8.
ii) S1-STKB[X,Y,Z]: These are the logics that are connected via the strong S1 connection
axiomatisation.
iii) S2-STKB[X,Y,Z]: These are the logics that are connected via the strong S2 connection
axiomatisation.
Proposition 36 a) All theorems of a logic W-STKB[X,Y,Z] are theorems of a corresponding
system w-TKBm[X,Y,Z].
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CodeW¤ Conditions
D
D
D
S4
T
D
T
S4
S4
D
S4
S4
S2:1 K(A)) B(A) Axiom X X X X X X
S2:2 B(A)) K(B(A)) Axiom X X X X X X
S2:3 B(A)) B(K(A)) Axiom X X X X X X
S2:4 :K(A)) B(:K(A))Axiom X X X X X X
S2:5 B(A)) :K(:A) S2:1 X X X X X X
S2:6 B(A), K(B(A)) S2:1 and K-T X X X X
S2:7 K(A)) B(K(A)) S2:1 and K-4 X X
S2:8 K(A)) K(B(A)) S2:1 and K-4 X X
S2:9 K(A)) B(B(A)) S2:1 and B-4 X X X
S2:10 :K(A), B(:K(A))S2:4 and K-4 X X
Table 6: Syntactical systems of knowledge and belief and Strong S2 connection axiomatisa-
tion.
b) All theorems of a logic S1-STKB[X,Y,Z] are theorems of a corresponding system s1-
TKBm[X,Y,Z].
c) All theorems of a logic S2-STKB[X,Y,Z] are theorems of a corresponding system s2-
TKBm[X,Y,Z].
Proof. The proof is established by using the translation from the syntactical system to
the respective modal system.
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